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      Around the world, the focus of copyright policy reform debates is 
shifting from the protection of copyright owners’ rights towards 
defining their appropriate limits. There is, however,  a great deal of 
confusion about the legal ontology of copyright “limits,” 
“exceptions,” “exemptions,” “defenses,” and “user rights.” While the 
choice of terminology may seem to be a matter of mere semantics, 
how we describe and conceptualize lawful uses within our copyright 
system has a direct bearing on how we delimit and define the scope 
of the owner’s control. Taking seriously the role of rhetoric in 
shaping law and policy, this Paper critically examines the recent 
embrace of the language of “users’ rights” to frame fair use, fair 
dealing, and other non-infringing acts. This terminology has been 
adopted to varying degrees by courts in Canada, Israel, and the 
United States and is increasingly employed by public interest 
advocates and policy-makers at the domestic and international level. 
In this Paper, I ask whether the rise of “user rights,” thus cast, is a 
positive development that will help to rein in some of copyright’s 
excesses, advancing the cause of content users and the public at 
large—or whether it is, perhaps, something of a false friend. 
Drawing on lessons from critical legal theory, I caution that “rights” 
may be a double-edged sword with the potential to undermine or 
obstruct the public interests, social values, and relationships that 
should inform copyright’s development in the digital age. As a 
rhetorical tool, “user rights” should therefore be wielded carefully if 
public interest advocates are to avoid self-inflicted injury. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, the international copyright system had been 
directed, almost exclusively, at ensuring a baseline level of 
protection across the globe for the rights of authors and copyright 
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owners.1 The predictable result of this policy preoccupation has been 
the continuous strengthening or “ratcheting up” of owners’ rights.2 
The coming into force, in 2016, of the Marrakesh Treaty,3 which 
requires Contracting Parties to enact specific exceptions to copyright, 
was therefore hailed as a “transformational moment in international 
copyright law.”4 The focus appears to be shifting from the rights of 
copyright owners to the rights of users of copyright-protected works. 
The Development Agenda, adopted in 2007 by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, provided a mandate and impetus for this 
international policy shift, emphasizing the importance of flexibilities, 
exceptions, and limitations in intellectual property norm-setting and 
 
 1. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 
1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]; World Intellectual 
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty]; Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
 2. Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, PIJIP RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 1, 1-4 (Oct. 
1, 2010) (detailing how intellectual property maximalists have sought to increase 
intellectual property protection and enforcement after the 1994 WTO TRIPS 
negotiations); see also PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL RATCHET FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: WHY IT FAILS AS POLICY AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT 
IT 1-5 (2003), https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/pdrahos/reports /pdfs/2003
globalipratchet.pdf (explaining that the main global intellectual property 
frameworks’ key is “giving to subsequent users of technology a set of core ‘use’ 
rights”); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO 
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE LAW, PUBLIC 
POWER: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); see 
generally James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual 
Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2004) (explaining errors arising from the 
owner-centric nature of the international IP regime); Pamela Samuelson, The US 
Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int’l L. 369 (1997) (detailing U.S. positions 
opposed to owner-centric intellectual property law); Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why 
the Leading International Copyright Convention Must be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 763 (2003) (describing fundamental problems with the Berne Convention). 
 3. The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons 
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 28, 2013, 52 
I.L.M. 1309 [hereinafter Marrakesh VIP Treaty]. 
 4. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, International Copyright: Marrakesh and the 
Future of Users’ Rights Exceptions, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 107, 107-27 (Mark Perry ed., 2016). 
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recognizing the benefits of a rich and accessible public domain.5 
Meanwhile, the realpolitik of the international economic order 
cautions against unbridled optimism in this regard.6 The “multi-
million dollar circus  needed to produce the [Marrakesh] Treaty,” as 
well as the still sputtering negotiations over a Draft Treaty on 
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, 
speaks to both the urgency and the obstacles at play in the tentative 
turn to user rights.7 Provoked in part by a period of rapid 
technological development, there can be little doubt that copyright 
limitations and exceptions are emerging as one of the most critical 
and controversial areas of copyright reform, both nationally and 
internationally.8 As Paul Goldstein predicts: “No corner of copyright 
law promises to be more vexed—or consequential—over the next 
quarter-century than exceptions and limitations.”9 
It is unfortunate, then, that there exists a great deal of confusion 
about how to understand and position copyright “limits,” 
“exceptions,” “exemptions,” and “defenses” within the overall 
copyright scheme. This is not simply a matter of semantics; it has 
more to do with legal ontology than mere terminology, in the sense 
that the very nature of the “thing” is at issue. Moreover, how we 
conceptualize the “privileges,” “liberties,” or “rights” of users to 
engage with copyright-protected works has a direct bearing on how 
we define the scope of those lawful uses and their availability to 
members of the public: an “exception” to an established right may be 
 
 5. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], The 45 Adopted 
Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, ¶¶ 16, 22 (2007) 
[hereinafter WIPO Development Agenda]. 
 6. See Jerome H. Reichman, The Limits of “Limitations and Exceptions” in 
Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
292, 302 (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). 
 7. Id. at 302. 
 8. See RUTH L. OKEDIJI, Reframing International Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions as Development Policy, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS 
AND EXCEPTIONS 429, 432 (2017) (questioning whether current intellectual 
property law’s understanding of limitations and exceptions actually helps 
developing-states). 
 9. Paul Goldstein, Reviews and Endorsements, (reviewing COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS) (last visited July 8, 2017), 
http://www.cambridge.org/ca/academic/subjects/law/intellectual-
property/copyright-law-age-limitations-and-exceptions?format=HB&isbn=
9781107132375#theogtb8WzHQLJ7r.97. 
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narrowly drawn as a matter of principle; the burden of making out a 
“defense” may be placed squarely on the shoulders of the defendant; 
the “privilege” to use may be subject to specific and onerous 
conditions; the “right” to use may be enforced against others who 
would encroach upon it, including the rights-bearing copyright 
owner. But more than this, the legal language we choose comes 
loaded with its own rhetorical force and, in our public discourse and 
legal imagination, few if any words can hold more power than the 
claim to “right.” 
Perhaps for this reason, it has become increasingly common for 
public interest and public domain advocates in the intellectual 
property arena to articulate the need for copyright limitations and 
exceptions in terms that evoke the user’s “right” to use a protected 
work or elements of it.10  To date, the language of “users’ rights” has 
found its greatest formal endorsement in Canada, where the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed that fair dealing and other copyright 
exceptions are “users’ rights” and must be interpreted as such.11 
Amongst those of us who have advocated in favor of greater freedom 
for fair and lawful uses of copyright-protected works, the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision to bequeath upon a rarely accepted 
defense the label of “right” was hailed as a great victory for users 
and the public.12 It seemed to represent a hard-fought win against the 
 
 10. See, e.g., Global Network on Copyright User Rights, INFO JUSTICE, 
http://infojustice.org/flexible-use (last visited July 8, 2017) (describing the Global 
Network on Copyright User Rights,  a group coordinated by the American 
University Washington College of Law Program on Information Justice and 
Intellectual Property, focusing on “the publications of research and provision of 
technical assistance to explain how adopting more open, flexible and general user 
rights . . . can promote social and economic interests”). 
 11. See, e.g., Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, [2012] 2 
S.C.R. 345 (Can.); Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. 
Bell Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326 (Can.); CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper 
Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). 
 12. See, e.g., Carys Craig, The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian 
Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW, 437, 452 (Michael Geist ed., 2005) 
(attributing the Canadian Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of fair dealing 
to the identification of a sole intended beneficiary); Abraham Drassinower, Taking 
User Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW, 462, 477 (Geist ed., 2005) (noting the necessity of rejecting a 
sweat-of-the-brow originality standard for a skill and judgment standard when 
reforming Canadian copyright law); Graham Reynolds, Towards a Right to 
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overwhelming forces that had advanced the cause of copyright 
owners and corporate interests in the battle over the new 
technological terrain (albeit in a case involving the distinctly 
twentieth-century technology of photocopiers and fax machines).13 
The judicial acknowledgment that unauthorized users of works had 
“rights” to assert in the face of infringement claims was quite simply 
a game-changer for Canadian copyright law.14 Prior to this, Canada’s 
courts had acknowledged the “rights” only of plaintiff copyright 
owners, against which the mere “interests” of defendants—and the 
public at large—had typically paled. Fair dealing had 
correspondingly been relegated to a marginal exception, available in 
theory but never in practice affording a defense to a prima facie 
infringement.15 The recognition of user rights thus dramatically 
corrected Canada’s traditionally owner-centric regime as it was 
adjusted to the new digital century. It seemed to retrieve the 
individual user from the rhetoric of authorship rewards and economic 
incentives that had, for so long, threatened to obscure her. 
At this moment in time, it is fair to say that “virtually every other 
country in the world has less clearly enshrined users’ rights than has 
Canadian law: no one else’s courts (or legislators) explicitly express 
the exceptions to the rights of rights-holders to be users’ rights.”16 
Commentators in jurisdictions where exceptions to copyright 
 
Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright-Protected Expression, in 
FROM RADICAL EXTREMISM TO BALANCED COPYRIGHT: CANADIAN COPYRIGHT 
AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 395, 397 (Michael Geist ed., 2010); Myra J. Tawfik, 
The Supreme Court of Canada and the “Fair Dealing Trilogy:” Elaborating a 
Doctrine of User Rights Under Canadian Copyright Law, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 191, 
191-92 (2013); David Vaver, Copyright Defenses as User Rights, 60 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 661, 667-68 (2013) (describing the impact of the seminal case CCH 
Canadian on balancing user’s rights). But see Pascale Chapdelaine, The 
Ambiguous Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 5 (2013) 
(cautioning against the damaging effects of the uncertain nature of users’ rights on 
the coherence and legitimacy of copyright law). 
 13. Vaver, supra note 12, at 667. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Craig, supra note 12, at 452; Carys J. Craig, Digital Locks and the Fate 
of Fair Dealing in Canada: In Pursuit of ‘Prescriptive Parallelism’, 13 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 503 (2010). 
 16. Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Copyright Users’ Rights in International Law, 60 
L. PUBLICATIONS 9, 10 (2014), http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lawpub/84. 
But see infra Section II.D. (discussing the growing status of user rights in 
comparative and international contexts). 
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infringement remain narrow and comparably ineffectual might 
reasonably look upon the Canadian example with something like 
envy.17 Even those who hail from jurisdictions where fair use is 
flexible and capable of expansive application in service of social 
goals18 find good cause to wish for a similar judicial utterance.19 
Advocates interested in globalizing fair use and safeguarding 
copyright limitations and exceptions at the international level may 
also see the potential of asserting “user rights” to advance their cause 
in the global arena.20 But before we rush to conclude that the idea of 
“users’ rights” is a shining beacon, guiding copyright inexorably 
towards its public policy goals, we should ask: Are there any risks, 
any potential downsides, associated with this rhetoric of “user 
rights,” even (or especially) for those who hold most dear the very 
interests newly cloaked in “rights?”  Is this purely a triumph for the 
public interest; galvanizing users, validating their demands, and 
constraining copyright’s corrosive expansion? Or, is there a price to 
pay for repackaging the public interest in the rhetorical wrapping of 
“user rights?” 
In seeking to answer this question, I begin by describing, in Part 
 
 17. See, e.g., Alexandra Sims, The Case for Fair Use in New Zealand, 24 INT’L 
J.L. INFO. TECH. 176, 176-202 (2016); Hoachen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User 
Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 178-87 (2011) (“By giving judicial recognition to the 
idea of fair dealing as a user’s right, rather than a defense, the Supreme Court of 
Canada expressly embraced a broad-based approach to interpreting the scope of the 
fair dealing doctrine in order to protect the public interest.”). 
 18. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (creating an open, flexible, and general 
fair use defense); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579-80 
(1994) (referring to the “fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright . . .  [flowing from] the need simultaneously to protect 
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it”). 
 19. See Niva Elkin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights, 32 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 1, 42 (2016) (arguing that a user rights approach to fair use may offer a 
more robust safeguarding of users’ liberties in the digital ecosystem); Lior Zemer, 
Authors and Users: Lessons from Outre-Mer, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 231, 263-67 
(2013). 
 20. See, e.g., Wilkinson, Copyright Users’ Rights, supra note 16, at 12 
(arguing that the protections for libraries and archives can best be advanced by 
enshrining user rights in an international copyright instrument); Thomas Riis & 
Jens Hemmingsen Schovsbo, Users’ Rights: Reconstructing Copyright Policy on 
Utilitarian Grounds, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1 (2007) (proposing the 
enactment of concrete rules recognizing users’ rights at the national and 
international level in order to counter-balance the proprietary logic of the current 
copyright system). 
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II, the traditional role of rights-based reasoning in our copyright 
system as a justification for the broad protection of authors and 
owners. I point to the ways in which the rhetoric of rights has 
typically been wielded to achieve outcomes that fail to serve the 
purposes of the copyright system by privileging private entitlement 
over the public interest. I then chart the rise of countervailing “users’ 
rights” in Canada, in particular, and the role that they have played in 
ostensibly recalibrating the so-called copyright balance. The 
discussion then turns to the status of user rights in comparative and 
international contexts, and their growing prevalence in copyright 
policy and law-making globally. Part III warns of some of the ways 
in which the idea of “users’ rights” might, somewhat counter-
intuitively, obstruct efforts to advance the interests of users and the 
public in and through the copyright system. Part IV looks beyond the 
copyright context, asking the more general question: “[W]hat is 
wrong with rights?”21 Briefly sketching out some of the core “rights 
critiques” offered by critical legal scholars over the past few decades, 
I present some reasons for skepticism about the capacity of rights to 
remedy inequalities and rectify power imbalances. Turning to 
Feminist and Critical Race Theory, however, I consider whether 
there may, nonetheless, be good reasons to embrace rights-talk, if not 
as an ideological commitment, then as a strategic tool. In Part V, I 
conclude with some thoughts about how these lessons from the 
landscape of legal theory might helpfully extend into the realm of 
copyright law—informing efforts to expand copyright limitations 
and exceptions in pursuit of globalized fair use. 
Ultimately, I argue that the language of “user rights” has an 
important role to play in advancing the public interest—albeit 
primarily a pragmatic one. There is a risk, however, to embracing 
“user rights” without problematizing the traditional conception of 
“right” and refining our rhetoric. The inherently individualizing and 
obfuscatory nature of right-based reasoning—whether employed in 
respect of authors, owners or users—has the potential to obscure the 
public interests, social values, and relationships that should inform 
copyright’s development in the digital age. At the same time, the 
escalation of rights rhetoric in the copyright debate threatens to 
 
 21. See infra Part IV (outlining objections raised by the school of Critical Legal 
Studies). 
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compound rather than to contest the moral or proprietary claims to 
right made of behalf of  copyright owners. The concept of “user 
rights,” then, is potentially a double-edged sword that should be 
wielded carefully if public interest advocates are to avoid a self-
inflicted injury. 
II. RIGHTS RHETORIC IN COPYRIGHT 
DISCOURSE 
A. THE RISE OF AUTHORS’ “RIGHTS” 
The language of rights has long played an important role in our 
copyright system. As many leading copyright scholars have 
demonstrated, the idea of the author’s right to own that which he 
creates through his intellectual effort permeates the foundations of 
copyright law.22 While it was not always thus,23 the inception of the 
modern common law copyright regime with the enactment of the 
Statute of Anne,24 and the subsequent “battle of the booksellers” that 
played out in the courts, solidified the notion of the author as right-
bearer, and copyright as his natural entitlement.25 Though arguably 
 
 22. See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 609, 610-11 (1993) (describing Hegel’s interpretation of property); 
PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 120 (1996); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 110 (1990); Richard Epstein, Liberty Versus Property - Cracks in the 
Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005); Wendy J. 
Gordon, A Property RIGHT in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1593 (1993) 
(highlighting the permeation of language relating to copyright in Lockean theory); 
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 287 
(1988) (noting that, throughout history, Americans have been obsessed with the 
idea of property, starting with the Pilgrims); Tom Palmer, Are Patents and 
Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal 
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 820 (1990) (detailing the Utilitarian 
theory of property). 
 23. See MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT, 
AND POWER 67-68 (2001) (explaining that the idea of plagiarism is a relatively new 
concept, as ancient tradition regarded it as the passing down of stories and ideas). 
 24. Copyright Act 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.). 
 25. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 11 (1968)(explaining that “the problem of authors’ rights did not 
become a significant issue until the eighteenth century, and then only because the 
booksellers made it so in an effort to perpetuate their monopoly after the Statute of 
Anne.”); also Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (KB)(finding that a 
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conceived as a pragmatic means to disrupt the London booksellers’ 
monopoly under the Stationers’ Charter, and justified as a route by 
which to encourage public learning, the Statute of Anne placed the 
exclusive right to copy in the hands of the author.26 Upon expiration 
of the temporary monopoly established under the statute, a series of 
cases brought by publishers before the courts sought to establish the 
author’s natural (though assignable) right to own his work—the 
fruits of his labor—as property.27 The argument was ultimately 
rejected by a majority of the House of Lords, but the rhetoric of 
rights stuck fast within the public consciousness and the legal 
imagination.28 Converging with the philosophical rise of 
enlightenment values of possessive individualism, and the practical 
growth of a literate public and a market economy, the idea of the 
author’s right to own his work took root and flourished inside the 
greenhouse glass of copyright law.29 
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
rights of the author-owner rose to dominate the jurisprudence of the 
British courts (and, by extension, those of colonial Canada), and to 
shape the legal doctrine that defined the subject and scope of 
copyright.30 In the common law world, at least, the continued 
commitment to this notion of the author’s right found its rationale in 
the Lockean labor-acquisition theory.31 Regarded through this 
theoretical lens, the author is the worthy intellectual laborer, 
deserving to reap what he has sown, while the user is the thief or 
 
common law interest in the work vested in the author as a matter of natural 
justice); Donaldson v. Beckett, [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HL) (ruling that authors 
had no common law interest in their works post publication). 
 26. See Patterson, supra note 25, at 14 (describing the Statute of Anne as a 
“trade regulation device” that was misconstrued as providing for an author’s right). 
 27. RONAN DEAZELEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE 
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1696-1775) 
31-50 (2004). 
 28. See Patterson, supra note 25, at 15 (arguing that it was in fact the overruled 
Millar v. Taylor decision, supra note 26, that had the greatest effect upon copyright 
doctrine, “firmly fix[ing] the idea of copyright as an author’s right.” 
 29. See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 
(1993); Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v Becket and the 
Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988). 
 30. Patterson, supra note 25, at 4-7. 
 31. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 10-19 (1690) 
(establishing the labor-acquisition theory). 
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trespasser who seeks to benefit from the author’s pains.32 Such a 
rights-based account of copyright had the effect of expanding the 
scope of protection available to “authors,” lowering the threshold for 
protection in order to ensure that labor, effort, and expense did not go 
unrewarded.33 Thus, the protection of transcribed speeches, 
laboriously compiled telephone directories, betting coupons, and tax 
forms was justified as necessary for preventing the misappropriation 
of labor.34 Over the same period, a similar logic guaranteed the 
continued expansion of protectable subject matter (from books to 
maps and charts to artistic, musical, and dramatic works) as well as 
the expanded duration of authors’ rights (from fourteen years plus a 
further fourteen upon renewal to the life of the author plus fifty years 
beyond his death).35 
From early in the life of the modern copyright system, the rights-
based reasoning of the courts shifted copyright away from the social 
goals that it was conceived to serve,36 and caused it to become, 
instead, a body of law focused overwhelmingly on the protection of 
the (intellectual) property and private interests of owners. It is to this 
end that rights rhetoric has traditionally been deployed in the 
copyright context—that is, to the benefit of owners and the 
undeniable detriment of users. In light of such concerns, I have 
argued elsewhere against an individual rights-based account of the 
copyright system in general, and more specifically, against the use of 
 
 32. See Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author’s Right: A 
Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN’S L.J. 1 
(2002) (describing Lockean theory’s role in broadening the scope of author’s 
rights); Hogg v. Scott, [1874] 18 L.R. 763, 485 (CH) (“[T]he defendant is not at 
liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which the plaintiff has been at for the 
purpose of producing his work, that is, in fact, merely to take away the result of 
another man’s labour, or, in other words, his property.”). 
 33. Craig, supra note 32, at 12-15. 
 34. See e.g., Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd., [1964] 1 ALL ER 465 (HL) 
(differentiating between material that requires intellectual work and those that are 
banal); Walter v. Lane, [1900] 83 L.T. 289 (HL); Kelly v Morris, [1866] 14 L.T. 
222 (CH); MacMillan & Co. v. Cooper, (1923) 40 T.L.R. 186 (India). 
 35. See Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities and the Reasons for Their 
Decline in Nineteenth Century Europe, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON 
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 157, 191 (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & 
Lionel Bently eds., 2010) (contrasting the English fixed terms of right to the 
unknown terms for other European countries). 
 36. See generally DEAZELEY, supra note 27 (discussing the underlying public 
purposes of the Statute of Anne). 
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rights rhetoric to justify the powers granted to authors by copyright 
law.37 The deontological claim that authors naturally have rights over 
their works casts copyright as a legal structure designed primarily or 
exclusively to recognize and protect authors’ independently existing 
rights as a matter of justice or entitlement. The private powers 
granted by law thus appear to be self-evident, requiring no further 
justification, while the public interests at stake become, at best, a 
matter of secondary concern. As the following discussion reveals, 
when authorial right is a baseline assumption, copyright exceptions 
or limitations are inevitably viewed with suspicion, manifesting as 
prima facie unjust encroachments upon the natural entitlement of the 
worthy, rights-bearing author. 
B. THE DEMISE OF FAIR DEALING 
The traditional rights-based approach to copyright justifies and 
nurtures the tendency to afford always greater protection against 
more uses of the work, such that almost any unauthorized use 
amounts to unlawful trespass and infringement.38 More specifically, 
over the course of the twentieth century, in the Anglo-Canadian law, 
rights-based reasoning was employed to limit the scope and 
availability of exceptions to infringement, diminishing the 
importance of fair uses of protected works, reducing fair dealing to a 
narrow and exceptional defense, and essentially marginalizing the 
interests of users and the public almost to the point of irrelevance. A 
detailed review of the British and Canadian fair dealing provisions 
and jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this project,39 but the claim 
is neither new nor controversial.  There is a clear connection between 
 
 37. See CARYS J CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, COMMUNICATION & CULTURE: TOWARDS 
A RELATIONAL THEORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW (2011) (proposing a teleological 
justification for the copyright system that supports protecting works of authorship 
only because, and to the extent that, such protection encourages dialogic 
participation in a cultural process of creativity and exchange.) 
 38. Id. at 85-97 (arguing that the individualist rights-based account of copyright 
invokes the powerful normative force of natural law in support of author’s claim, 
inevitably resulting in the widening of copyright protection contrary to its public 
purposes.) 
 39. See id.; Guiseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing?: A Comparative 
Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair 
Use, 53 MCGILL L. REV. 309, 327 (2008) (emphasizing that an analysis of the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s interpretation must include an understanding of 
Parliament’s policy objectives). 
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the commitment to protecting authors’ rights as a matter of 
entitlement and the limited scope available for successfully asserting 
a defense to an infringement claim. 
By the early nineteenth century, the fair use or fair dealing defense 
developed by the courts had begun to resemble its modern form.40 
Although the initial development of a concept of fair use was 
somewhat piecemeal, the early cases suggest that fair uses were 
judicially recognized because they involved “originality on the part 
of the . . . user as manifested in a new work that also promoted the 
progress of science and thereby benefited the public.”41 That such 
uses were beyond the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
domain was at least partly in appreciation of the intellectual effort 
expended by the user in the creation of a cognizably ‘new work;’ but 
the primary rationale for allowing such uses seems to have been the 
public benefit afforded by this ‘newness’—the value of the 
defendant’s contribution to knowledge and encouragement of 
learning.42 Indeed, a finding of ‘piracy’ was largely reserved for the 
cases where no obvious public interest was being served by the 
defendant’s copying.43 Courts were able to resolve copyright disputes 
without the kind of absolutism typical of a rights-based approach; 
 
 40. Macklin v. Richardson, [1770] 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (CH); Dodsley v. 
Kinnersley, [1761] 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (CH); Tonson v. Walker, [1752] 36 Eng. Rep. 
1017 (App.); Gyles v. Wilcox, [1740] 27 Eng. Rep. 682 (CH) (holding that real 
and fair abridgments may be called a new book); see generally ISABELLA 
ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY (2010). 
 41. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
 42. See, e.g., Scott v. Stanford, [1867] 16 L.T. 51 (L.R. Eq.); D’Alamaine v. 
Boosey, [1835] 160 Eng. Rep. 117 (L.R. Exch.); Martin v. Wright, [1833] 58 Eng. 
Rep. 605 (L.R. Eq.) (holding that a person may copy and publish literature if 
annotated and in connection to his own research); Mawman v. Tegg, [1826] 38 
Eng. Rep. 380 (CH). 
 43. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fullarton, [1839] 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (CH) (rejecting a 
fair use defence on the basis that the defendant had expended “no other labour . . . 
than in copying the work”); Roworth v. Wilkes, [1807] 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (KB) 
(finding infringement where the defendant’s work simply involved 
“communication of the same knowledge”); see generally Kathy Bowrey, On 
Clarifying the Role of Originality and Fair Use in 19th Century UK Jurisprudence: 
Appreciating “the Humble Grey Which Emerges as the Result of Long 
Controversy,” in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF PROF. DAVID VAVER 45 (Lionel Bently, Giuseppina D’Agostino & 
Catherine Ng eds., 2010). 
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instead, the concepts of fair abridgment, fair use, and legitimate 
taking permitted the nuanced application of copyright in a way that 
cohered with the recognized social goals of the copyright system.44 
Of course, in an environment where the copyright owner’s right 
was limited to the reproduction of a literary work as such, copyright 
control was the exception and fair use of a work was the norm.45 In 
that context, the idea that users and the public possessed a general 
right to deal fairly with the work—in the absence of narrow right 
explicitly granted to the copyright owner—was simply assumed.46 As 
copyright steadily expanded to provide ever stronger rights over 
more works, however, the equitable principle of fair use 
correspondingly took root and flourished, becoming an established 
part of the British and Commonwealth copyright law until the turn of 
the twentieth century.47 As late as 1915, shortly after fair dealing was 
statutorily enacted in the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911, the 
authoritative treatise writer, W.A. Copinger, made reference to “the 
rights of the fair user” that had long been enjoyed under the law.48 
Although the 1911 Act enumerated specific purposes for which a 
 
 44. See Kylie Pappalardo & Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright, Fair Use and the 
Australian Constitution, in COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVES: PAST, PRESENT AND 
PROSPECT 125-64 (Brian Fitzgerald & John Gilchrist eds., 2015) (arguing that, 
consistent with the historical development of copyright and fair use, the productive 
or fair use of a protected work is not, by definition, an infringing copy capable of 
regulation by the copyright system). 
 45. Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limits and Exceptions, in 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 12, 16-17 (Ruth L. 
Okediji ed., 2017). 
 46. See id. at 12-59 (noting that, “[w]hen rights were narrow, it was 
unnecessary to create exceptions to limit those rights . . . [but] as legislatures 
expanded authorial rights . . . the need to create limits on the exclusive rights 
became apparent); Videotape: Copyright User Rights and Access to Justice: Q&A 
with Professor David Vaver, (May 18, 2017), 
https://ctl2.uwindsor.ca/vidlinks/FF05B3B16B91BBE2.html. 
 47. Pappalardo & Fitzgerald, supra note 44, at 125-64; see also Ariel Katz, 
Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in THE COPYRIGHT 
PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 93, 101-02 (Michael Geist ed., 2013)(arguing that the 
widely perceived distinction between U.S.-style open-ended fair use and fair 
dealing is a myth). 
 48. WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, IN WORKS OF 
LITERATURE, ART, ARCHITECTURE, PHOTOGRAPHY, MUSIC AND THE DRAMA: 
INCLUDING CHAPTERS ON MECHANICAL CONTRIVANCES AND CINEMATOGRAPHS 
144 (5th ed. 1915). 
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dealing might be fair (private study, research, criticism, review, or 
newspaper summary),49 it was Copinger’s assumption that 
established user rights to deal fairly with work, which “has always 
been . . . permitted”50 for other purposes, were not intended to be cut 
down by the new law. 
As it happened, the introduction of these statutorily limited fair 
dealing purposes did precipitate a steady shift away from an 
equitable principle of fair use and towards a restrictive fair dealing 
defense.51 The Act was met by the courts with an increasing 
formalism in statutory interpretation, and the conceptual elevation of 
private property and contractual rights over the public interest 
considerations that had previously prevailed.52 The judiciary that had 
been so active in developing fair use subsequently proved active in 
reining it in.53 Gradually there developed a more restrictive view of 
fair dealing as necessarily confined to the list of statutorily approved 
purposes which should themselves be narrowly construed as 
exceptional.54 As part of the same process, courts increasingly 
adopted a bifurcated approach to assessing liability; determining 
whether a use was substantial and prima facie infringement before 
assessing the availability of a fair dealing defense.55 Put differently, 
the courts would first establish the existence of owner’s right and its 
violation and only then ask whether a defense might be made out. 
Increasingly, any minimally substantial use was regarded as an 
incursion onto the property rights of the owner which could be 
 
 49. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (Eng.) (establishing that  
“any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review or newspaper summary” would not constitute an infringement of 
copyright). 
 50. COPINGER, supra note 48, at 144. 
 51. Copyright Act 1911, c. 46, § 2(1)(i). 
 52. Robert Burrell, Reining in Copyright Law: Is Fair Use the Answer?, 2001 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 361 (2001). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Hawkes & Son Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service Ltd., [1934] 50 
T.L.R. 315 (CH); British Oxygen Co. v. Liquid Air Ltd., [1925] 133 L.T. 282 
(CH); Alexandra Sims, Strangling Their Creation: The Courts’ Treatment of Fair 
Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 192 (2010). 
 55. See Hawkes & Son Ltd., at 602 (detailing Lord Hamworth M.R.’s assertion 
of substantial taking by asking whether the part taken “is so slender that it would 
be impossible to recognize it”); Johnstone v. Bernard Jones Publication, [1938] 
159 L.T. 15 (CH). 
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excused only in a limited number of specific circumstances.56 The 
user’s historical right to deal fairly for any purpose was reduced to a 
minimally permitted encroachment on the owner’s exclusive domain. 
According to Burrell, the judicially developed fair dealing defense 
had been no more than a necessary limit on the massive expansion of 
copyright that took place, largely at the hands of the same judiciary, 
since the enactment of the Statute of Anne.57 From this perspective, 
the subsequent cases that dramatically narrowed the Fair Use 
principle “look much less like an attempt to step back from an overly 
broad judicially created exception and much more like a further 
extension of owners’ rights.”58 While the perception of copyright as 
the author/owner’s proprietary right grew throughout the latter part 
of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, the Fair Use 
doctrine found itself on increasingly uncertain footing. The resultant 
fair dealing defense, thus, came to reflect little more than “a reluctant 
but necessary concession to users”59 on which it was unwise for 
anyone to rely. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the fair dealing defense suffered 
a similar fate before the Canadian courts.60 It was bound too tightly 
to the same strict statutory language and unable to escape the 
prevalent assumption that use of an another’s work without 
permission was de facto unfair.61 The tendency amongst Canadian 
courts was to reject the fair dealing defense because the use was 
necessarily unfair,62 or because it was not for an enumerated 
 
 56. See Hawkes & Son Ltd., at 315. 
 57. Burrell, supra note 52, at 367-73. 
 58. Id. at 367. 
 59. See Melissa de Zwart, A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing 
and Fair Use: Lessons for the Digital Age, 2007 INTELL. PROP. Q. 60, 90 (2007). 
 60. Katz, supra note 47, at 101-02. 
 61. Id. 
 62. E.g., R. v. James Lorimer & Co., [1984] 1 F.C. 1065, 1075 (Can. C.A.) 
(finding the defendant’s abridgement of a government report to be unfair because 
the defence requires “some dealing with the work other than simply condensing it 
into an abridged version.”); Zamacois v. Douville, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 257, 284-85 
(Can. Ex. Ct.) (denying fair dealing because “a critic cannot, without being guilty 
of infringement, reproduce in full, without the author’s permission, the work which 
he criticizes.”); B.W. Int’l Inc. v. Thomson Canada Ltd., [1996] 137 D.L.R. 4th 
398, 409 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (holding that the publication of a leaked work 
cannot be fair). 
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purpose.63 But perhaps the most striking example of the restrictive 
interpretation of enumerated purposes is found in Cie Générale des 
Etablissement Michelin-Michelin & Cie. v. C.A.W. –Canada64 which 
held that the defendants’ parody of a corporate logo could not be 
included within the category of “criticism.”65 Justice Teitlebaum 
emphasized throughout his reasons that the objectives of copyright 
law are “[t]he protection of authors and ensuring that they are 
recompensed for their creative energies and works.”66 Rejecting the 
defendants’ free speech argument, Justice Teitlebaum reasoned: 
In the balance of interest and rights, if the Defendants have no right to use 
the Plaintiff’s [work], they have a multitude of other means for expressing 
their views. However, if the Plaintiff loses its right to control the use of its 
copyright, there is little left to the Plaintiff’s right of private property.67 
It was held that the users had no right to use the plaintiff’s work; 
their constitutional right to free expression could extend no further 
than the boundaries of the plaintiff’s property.68 I have argued 
elsewhere that the Michelin court’s commitment to the idea of 
copyright as the owner’s property right caused it to reify the 
boundaries of the corporation’s exclusive domain and overlook the 
social values at stake in the defendant’s political use of the plaintiff’s 
logo/work. The elevation of the plaintiff’s right justified prohibiting 
the defendant’s speech, and disregarded the transformative and 
expressive nature of the defendant’s downstream use.69 The 
defendant Union’s claim of right to fair dealing and free expression 
 
 63. E.g., Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, 304 (Can. Fed. Ct.) 
(finding that a biography was not a work of research because “the use 
contemplated by private study and research is not one in which the copied work is 
communicated to the public.”); Boudreau v. Lin, [1997] 150 D.L.R. 4th 324, 331 
(Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (holding that a university’s copying and sale of course 
materials was not for the purposes of “private study” because the materials were 
distributed to all members of a class). 
 64. [1996] 71 C.P.R. 3d 348 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
 65. Id. at 381. 
 66. Id. at 376-77 (defining the objectives of the Act as being to protect “the 
interests of authors and copyright holders”). 
 67. Id. at 377. 
 68. Id. at 376. 
 69. See generally Carys J. Craig, Putting the Community in Communication: 
Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright, 56 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 75, 83-84, 93 (2006) [Craig, Putting the Community in 
Communication] (reviewing Canadian copyright cases and law). 
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simply ceded to the copyright owner’s right.70 
This brings us to the landmark case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law 
Soc’y of Upper Can..71 The defendant, the Great Library of Osgoode 
Hall, argued that its photocopy service was provided for the purpose 
of research or private study. The plaintiff publishers responded that it 
is the purpose only of the person dealing with the work (the library 
staff member) that is relevant—not the purposes of the researchers 
for whom copies were made.72 At first instance, Justice Gibson 
agreed: 
The copying by the defendant . . . was not for a purpose within the 
ambit of fair dealing notwithstanding that the ultimate use by the 
requester of the photocopying might itself be within the ambit of fair 
dealing . . . I am satisfied that the fair dealing exception should be 
strictly construed.73 
As the foregoing would suggest, this judgment was characteristic 
of the narrow confines within which the fair dealing defense had 
been drawn,74 reflecting the overarching concern in Canada’s 
copyright tradition with the protection of author’s rights. The claim 
that fair dealing should be subject to strict construction—a claim 
peppered throughout the Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on fair 
dealing prior to CCH—flows from the conviction that fair dealing is 
exceptional and antithetical to the normative presupposition of the 
copyright system; namely, that the author has the right to exclusive 
control over the work. Indeed, Justice Gibson began his analysis by 
stating: 
 
 70. See id. at 82. See also Jane Bailey, Deflating the Michelin Man in IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Geist ed. 
2005); Bita Amani, Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between 
Work and Play in DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: CREATING CANADIAN CULTURE 
ONLINE (Rosemary J. Coombe, Darren Wershler and Martin Zellinger eds. 2013); 
Graham J. Reynolds, Moving Past Michelin: Towards Judicial Reconsideration of 
the Intersection of Copyright and the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression 
(2017) 30 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL (Forthcoming). 
 71. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). 
 72. Id. at 385. 
 73. Id. at 403. 
 74. Contra Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [1997], 36 O.R. 3d 201 
(Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (finding that the reproduction of a photograph was fair 
dealing for the purposes of news reporting because the entire work was copied); 
Allen v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [1995], 26 O.R. 3d 208 (Can. Ont. Gen. 
Div.) (noting that there was no substantial reproduction of the plaintiff’s work). 
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The object and purpose of the Copyright Act is to benefit authors, albeit 
that in benefiting authors, it is capable of having a substantially broader-
based public benefit through the encouragement of disclosure of works 
for the advancement of learning or, as in this case, the wider 
dissemination of law.75 
This was in line with the Supreme Court’s earlier insistence, in the 
1990 decision of Bishop v. Stevens, that the “single object” of the 
Copyright Act was “the benefit of authors of all kinds.”76 Notably, 
the Court in that case had similarly insisted upon a narrow reading of 
the statutory exceptions available to users in the Act.77 Once again, 
where copyright was regarded as solely or even primarily aimed at 
protecting the rights of the author/owner, the user’s claim to fair 
dealing lost out to the copyright owner’s right of exclusive control. 
The powers conferred on authors to control their works have 
steadily strengthened in scope and form owing, at least in part, to the 
persistent presence of rights-based reasoning and rhetoric in the 
Anglo common law tradition. While twentieth-century Canada offers 
a compelling example, similar patterns emerged in different contexts 
around the globe at both the domestic and the international level.78 
Wherever one looks, it seems clear that deontological explanations 
for copyright law, framed in natural rights rhetoric and loaded with 
presumptions of moral entitlement, inevitably support the expansive 
protection of copyright and circumscribe the uses that might lawfully 
be made of works that fall within the perceived scope of the author’s 
 
 75. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 388. 
 76. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 (Can.) (citing Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. 
Hammond’s Bradford Brewery Co., [1934] 1 Ch. 121, 127 (C.A.)). 
 77. Id. at 480-81 (“an implied exception . . . is all the more unlikely . . . in light 
of the detailed and explicit exemptions in [the Act]”); see also Michelin v. CAW – 
Can., [1996] 71 C.P.R. 3d 348, 381 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
 78. See Justice Laddie, Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-
Rated?, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 253, 259 (1996) (arguing that the narrow 
confines of the U.K.’s fair dealing defense reflects “a complacent certainty that 
wider copyright protection is morally and economically justified”); Neil Netanel, 
Israeli Fair Use from an American Perspective, in CREATING RIGHTS: READINGS 
IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009) (describing the 
“market approach” to fair use discernable in some U.S. case law, wherein fair use 
is regarded as a narrow, anomalous exception to the copyright holder’s exclusive 
and broad proprietary rights); Pappalardo & Fitzgerald, supra note 44 (describing 
the historical development of fair use in the Australian context); Sims, supra note 
17, at 178 (arguing for expanded fair use in the New Zealand context). 
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right. What is also apparent, however, is that the continual expansion 
of copyright owners’ rights has met with growing attention to the 
burdens that copyright law places on members of the public, both as 
consumers and as citizens. Over time, and with more or less success, 
copyright limits, exceptions and defenses have thus evolved, 
“typically [to temper] the reach of these broad rights.”79 By the turn 
of the twenty-first century, with the proliferation of digital 
technologies, the public’s new creative and consumptive capabilities 
had come head-to-head with content owners’ greater capacity to 
control access, use, and sharing. As Niva Elkin-Koren explains, 
“[t]he rise of user rights is linked to fundamental changes in the 
creative ecosystem that pull in [these] opposite directions.”80 It is to 
the emergence of “user rights” that we now turn, picking up the trail 
in Canada where the Supreme Court issued, in 2004, what remains as 
“one of the strongest pro-user rights decisions from any high court in 
the world.”81 
C. THE RISE OF USER RIGHTS IN CANADA 
In order to understand how such a dramatic change in the fate of 
fair dealing could play out against the Canadian jurisprudential 
backdrop described above, we must first take note of the Supreme 
Court judgment released shortly after Justice Gibson’s lower court 
ruling in CCH; the pivotal case of Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit 
Champlain Inc..82 Meera Nair explains the relevance of that case for 
user rights and the public domain: 
It has been only in the new millennium that the rights of the public 
began to gain attention. In this regard, CCH Canadian was not the 
watershed moment; that distinction was earned two years earlier in 
[Théberge]. Even though the case had nothing to do with fair 
dealing, Justice Binnie, writing for the majority, decisively placed 
owners’ rights in service of the vitality of the public domain, and 
 
 79. Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limits, supra note 45, at 1. 
 80. Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights 
Approach, in COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 132, 135 
(Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2015). 
 81. Michael Geist, Low Tech Case Has High Impact, (Mar. 21, 2004), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2004/03/low-tech-case-has-high-tech-impact/. 
 82. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.). 
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made particular mention of the role of exceptions.83 
In Théberge, the Supreme Court articulated, for the first time, the 
idea that copyright is not primarily for the benefit of authors but is 
rather a “balance between promoting the public interest in the 
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect 
and obtaining a just reward for the creator;” stating that “[t]he proper 
balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only 
in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their 
limited nature.”84 While the so-called Théberge Balance was 
portrayed by the Court as merely describing how copyright is 
“usually presented,” in truth it represented a seismic shift in the 
copyright landscape.85  Suddenly, the public interest had weight on 
the justice scales of copyright—perhaps even a weight equal to that 
of the creator’s right. What had previously been an ownership right, 
subject only to narrow and exceptional limitations, became a right 
that had to be weighed against a variety of other interests and public 
policy objectives. 
As Nair implies, most importantly for our purposes, the limits to 
which the author’s rights are subject—the public interests that 
circumscribe the author’s claim—are given a positive dimension in 
the following passage from the case: 
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of 
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public 
domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-
term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to 
proper utilization. This is reflected in the exceptions to copyright 
infringement . . . which seek to protect the public domain in 
traditional ways such as fair dealing[.]86 
Cast in this light, fair dealing and other exceptions are not 
encroachments upon the creator’s rights but rather prevent the 
encroachment of creators’ rights into the public domain. Exceptions 
 
 83. Meera Nair, CCH Canadian: Ten Years Later, FAIR DUTY (Feb. 25, 2014, 
6:37 AM), https://fairduty.wordpress.com/2014/02/25/ten-years-later/. 
 84. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2 S.C.R. at 355. 
 85. Meera Nair, Fairness of Use: Different Journeys, in THE COPYRIGHT 
PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 235, 235 (Michael Geist ed. 2013). 
 86. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2 S.C.R. at 356. 
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remove copyright-created obstacles to the proper use of works. With 
that, the Canadian stage was set for the entrance of users’ rights. 
Following Théberge, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled in the 
CCH case, citing the need for balance and refusing to subject the fair 
dealing provisions to the traditionally narrow interpretation dominant 
in Canadian courts.87 Rather than casting fair dealing as a limited 
derogation from the norms of copyright law, Justice Linden 
explained that “user rights are not just loopholes” and are therefore 
deserving of a “fair and balanced reading.”88 The majority rejected 
Justice Gibson’s position that merely facilitating research was not 
research per se,89 and building on the multifactorial U.S. Fair Use 
Test,90 provided a principled survey of the “malleable” factors 
relevant to assessing fairness.91 
The resurrection of public interest played a similarly pivotal role 
and was “given added thrust”92 in the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
CCH. Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice McLaughlin 
endorsed the statement that “user rights are not just loopholes.”93 She 
stated that “research,” as an enumerated fair dealing purpose, “must 
be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that 
users’ rights are not unduly constrained.”94 The court’s new concern 
with the public purposes of the Copyright Act demanded renewed 
 
 87. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 384 (holding that 
the trial judge erred in law when he stated that exceptions to infringement must be 
“strictly construed,” because an overly restrictive interpretation of the exemptions 
contained in the Act would be inconsistent with the mandate of copyright law to 
harmonize owners’ rights with legitimate public interests). 
 88. Id. (quoting DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT LAW 171 (2000) 
 89. Id. at 387 (“In essence the Law Society can vicariously claim an individual 
end user’s fair dealing exemption, and step into the shoes of its patron.”). 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating an inclusive list of four factors to be 
considered in determining whether a use is fair: “(1) the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”). 
 91. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 342 (assessing the 
purpose, nature, and amount of the dealing, the nature of the work, the likely effect 
of the dealing, and the availability of alternatives to the dealing). 
 92. Nair, supra note 83. 
 93. CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 364. 
 94. Id. at 342. 
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focus on the user of copyrighted material and the uses to which 
protected works may freely be put. Adopting the multi-factor enquiry 
and engaging in a careful analysis of the interests in the balance at 
each stage, the court set the tone for an entirely different approach to 
fair dealing and other exceptions, bestowed with the title of “users’ 
rights” as copyright marched into the digital age (where cases would 
soon take judges far beyond the comfort zone of library photocopiers 
and case digests).95 
The adoption of the language of “user rights” is arguably the most 
striking manifestation of the inclusion of the public as a primary 
beneficiary of the copyright system whose interests therefore factor 
directly into the copyright “balance.” The broad reading of fair 
dealing that this entailed reflects the evolving role of users in 
Canadian copyright policy. As Drassinower explains: “the defence of 
fair dealing . . . is to be understood and deployed not negatively, as a 
mere exception, but rather positively, as a user right integral to 
copyright law.”96 The copyright holder’s interest in excluding others 
from its work has always benefited from the label of “right;” 
consequently, when owners’ rights have appeared to conflict with 
users’ interests in dealing with the protected work, the owners’ rights 
have readily prevailed. When the abstract concept of the public 
interest found more concrete expression in the form of users’ rights, 
its fate within the fair dealing analysis suddenly seemed brighter—
and its weight on copyright’s balancing scales heavier. As Vaver 
writes: “If the Copyright Act is to balance the activities of owners 
and users honestly, it must balance similar entities. Balancing rights 
against exceptions starts off with the scales biased towards rights and 
against exceptions.”97 
The CCH fair dealing ruling proved to be, not an outlier but, an 
initial indicator of a fundamental and sustained shift in the way that 
Canadian courts approach exceptions and defenses to copyright 
infringement. In 2012, the Supreme Court heard five copyright cases 
together, all of which involved appeals from decisions of the 
Copyright Board responsible for setting and approving licenses and 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Drassinower, supra note 12, at 467. 
 97. David Vaver, User Rights, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 105, 109 (2013). 
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tariff for collective societies.98 Two of these cases—Bell v. Society of 
Composers, Authors, and Music Publishers of Canada99 and Alberta 
v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency100—directly addressed the 
interpretation and application of the fair dealing provisions post-
CCH. It was argued before the court that the decision to characterize 
fair dealing as a “user’s right” had been in error and misconstrued the 
nature of defenses within the copyright regime.101 Rather than 
retreating from this assertion of fair dealing as a user right, however, 
the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reiterate the rights-based 
nature of fair dealing within copyright,102 and to accord a 
correspondingly large and liberal interpretation to the statutory 
wording of the defense. 
Thus, in Bell, which concerned the streaming of samples of 
musical works to consumers, Justice Abella found the activity to be 
consumer “research” and the communication by the online distributer 
to be “facilitating” such research.103 Taking the perspective of the 
user/consumer rather than the online-service provider when assessing 
the purpose of the dealing, Justice Abella explained: “This is 
consistent with the Court’s approach in CCH, where it described fair 
dealing as a ‘user’s right.’”104 In Alberta, a case that concerned the 
fraught question of educational copying by teachers for classroom 
use, the court again restated the rights-based nature of the 
defendant’s claim: “[F]air dealing is a “‘user’s right’, and the 
relevant perspective when considering whether the dealing is for an 
 
 98. See generally THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael 
Geist ed. 2013) (discussing issues raised by the five copyright decisions 
particularly, fair dealing, user rights, and the technology-neutral approach to 
copyright law). 
 99. 2 S.C.R. at 326. 
 100. 2 S.C.R. at 345. 
 101. See Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can., 2 S.C.R. at 
335. 
 102. Id. at 333 (“CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential part of 
furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act.  One of the tools 
employed to achieve the proper balance between protection and access in the Act is 
the concept of fair dealing, which allows users to engage in some activities that 
might otherwise amount to copyright infringement.”). 
 103. Id. at 334-35. 
 104. Id. at 338. 
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allowable purpose . . . is that of the user.”105 With this in mind, the 
court reasoned that the student/user who is engaged in research and 
public study shares a “symbiotic purpose” with the teacher/copier 
who may therefore benefit from the fair dealing defense.106 The 
nature of fair dealing as a user right demanded a “large and liberal” 
reading of the statutory defense.107 The constraints imposed on the 
scope of fair dealing by the Copyright Board were therefore found to 
be unreasonable. Many of the copies for which remuneration was 
sought were within the realm of the user’s right to deal fairly with 
works for research and private study. 
Another 2012 case before the court addressed a broadcasting 
regulatory regime that allowed broadcasters to control the 
simultaneous retransmission of local televisions signals. Because the 
Copyright Act contains an exception for such signals,108 which the 
court understood to be a “user’s right” and, therefore, “beyond the 
owner’s control,”109 it was held that the regulatory regime was ultra 
vires. Allowing the value for signal regime would “upset the aim of 
the Copyright Act to effect an appropriate ‘balance’” between 
authors’ and users’ rights.110 The court described the copyright 
system in the following terms: 
The Copyright Act is concerned both with encouraging creativity 
and providing reasonable access to the fruits of creative endeavor. 
These objectives are furthered by a carefully balanced scheme that 
creates exclusive economic rights for different categories of 
copyright[.] It also provides user rights such as fair dealing and 
specific exemptions that enable the general public or specific classes 
of users to access protected material under certain conditions.111 
As Myra Tawfik has argued, the court’s recognition of users’ 
rights “to access” certain protected material effects a subtle but 
 
 105. Alberta, 2 S.C.R. at 360. 
 106. Id. at 361. 
 107. Id. at 359-60. 
 108. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, ¶ 31 (Can.). 
 109. Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and 
Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 489, ¶ 58 (Can.); see 
Alberta, 2 S.C.R. at 370. 
 110. Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167, 2 S.C.R. ¶ 
67. 
 111. Id. ¶ 36. 
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meaningful development in the judicial conceptualization of defenses 
and their role in the copyright scheme: “[S]peaking in terms of 
‘access’ centers the discussion more squarely on the individual’s 
engagement as a user within the legislative scheme in the sense that 
access is provided to someone.”112 “Framed in terms of balance, what 
this means is that the rights of the copyright holder to protection 
must be weighed against the user’s right of access.”113 This in turn 
suggests growing appreciation of the importance of access to 
intellectual works as foundational, both within the copyright system 
and within democratic culture more broadly.114 In Tawfik’s terms, the 
“Canadian cases represent ‘a welcome affirmation of individuality 
[of users] within the larger international and comparative copyright 
contexts.’”115 
The Canadian copyright context thus provides an illustrative 
example of the apparent power of the concept of users’ rights to 
actively shift the balance between owners and users in the copyright 
system, strengthening users’ demands to constrain copyright 
(including by resisting the expansion of owner rights into new 
technological contexts). It is sufficient, I hope, to convince the reader 
that what might be considered merely semantic (the recognition of a 
“user right”) can in fact be a powerful legal tool that reaps practical 
results for users of copyright works and for the public interest in 
general. As noted at the outset, however, this is not only a Canadian 
story. While it may be said that “the Supreme Court of Canada has 
charted a decidedly Canadian approach to surveying the boundary 
between copyright protection and a ‘robustly cultured and 
intellectual public domain,’”116 the trajectory of users’ rights in 
Canadian jurisprudence could equally be regarded as indicative of a 
larger transnational shift in our understanding of copyright law and 
the interests at stake. As the next section explains, the Canadian 
example does not simply result in, but also reflects, a growing 
 
 112. Tawfik, supra note 12, at 198. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Laura J. Murray, Copyright Talk: Patterns and Pitfalls in Canadian 
Policy Discourses, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 15, 39 (Michael Geist ed. 2005) (arguing that a culture of public 
intellectual domains is sustained through access). 
 115. Tawfik, supra note 12, at 200. 
 116. Id. 
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recognition of users as individual rights-bearers within the copyright 
regime writ large. 
D. THE COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL TRAJECTORY OF 
USERS’ RIGHTS 
It is widely agreed that the most open and expansive approach to 
copyright exceptions can be found in the U.S. doctrine of fair use.117 
Without statutory limits as to the possible purposes for which fair use 
can be found, the fair use defense is flexible in its application and 
potentially broad in its scope. Fair use owes its origin to the British 
fair abridgement cases,118 but did not suffer the fate of fair dealing 
post-1911, continuing its judicial evolution up to and beyond its 
codification in 1976. Given the U.S. constitutional scheme wherein 
copyright’s purpose is explicitly “to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts,”119 the defense has also been somewhat less 
vulnerable than in the Commonwealth context to the rigid 
enforcement and prioritization of owners’ proprietary rights. In 
weighing the various factors for consideration in assessing the 
fairness of a use,120 it is common for courts to invoke the rights and 
interests of the author or owner but also those of the user and public 
at large; typically with a view to copyright’s constitutional 
purpose.121 As such, the extent to which a use transforms a protected 
work—adding new meaning or purpose—has become a key factor in 
determining the lawfulness of a use.122 Since 2005, as Neil Netanel 
 
 117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 118. Matthew Sag, The Pre-History of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373 
(2011). 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 120. See CCH Canadian v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 1 S.C.R. at 342. 
 121. See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 
815, 857 (2015) (describing a variety of policy-relevant “clusters” of fair use cases, 
including: free speech and expression uses, authorship-promoting uses, and uses 
that promote learning). 
 122. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 579; Pierre N. Leval, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (suggesting 
that, when considering the purpose of a use, courts should ask: “[D]id the use 
fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate creativity for public 
illumination?”); see generally Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 559, 625-26 (2016) (disputing the capacity of the 
tranformativeness test to advance rather than stifle artistic creativity); Laura A. 
Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 447 (2008) (arguing that assessing tranformativity with a 
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has shown, the “transformative use” approach has come to dominate 
the U.S. case law: “[This] paradigm views fair use as integral to 
copyright’s purpose of promoting widespread dissemination of 
creative expression, not a disfavored exception to copyright holders’ 
exclusive rights.”123 Framed as such, fair use is closely tied to the 
free speech rights of users, ensuring copyright’s purpose as an 
“engine of free expression” by acting as a “built-in free speech 
safeguard.”124 When U.S. courts and commentators invoke the idea 
of fair use as a matter of right, it is typically framed with the 
constitutional right of free speech or freedom of the press in mind.125 
It should be stressed, if only in passing, that fair use is not always 
or consistently accorded an expansive interpretation in the U.S. 
courts, notwithstanding its potential breadth. Indeed, its application 
is notoriously unpredictable, and courts, in their consideration of the 
relevant factors, often seem guided by underlying normative 
commitments to copyright as a moral entitlement or an economic 
right of the author/owner.126 They are also, of course, vulnerable to 
 
view to reader response, and not only authorial intent, changes the scope of 
transformative fair use); Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, supra note 121, 
at 817-18 (asserting that the influence of Campbell and its progeny may yet extend 
well beyond the current doctrine of transformative use); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy 
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves 
It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004) (arguing that the emphasis on transformation has 
limited awareness of the free speech considerations implicated by simple copying). 
 123. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 715, 736 (2011). 
 124. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (citing Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)). 
 125. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 63 (2008) 
(providing a thoughtful account of copyright and fair use as being explicitly 
grounded in First Amendment values); L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. 
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 123-24 (1991); 
Malla Pollack, A Listener’s Free Speech, A Reader’s Copyright, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1457, 1460 (2007); Tushnet, supra note 122, at 587, 589-90 (explaining the 
connections between fair use and free speech under the First Amendment). 
 126. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
558 (1985) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos. 
Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)) (“The fair use doctrine is not a license for 
corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines 
the underlying work contains material of possible public importance.”); Worldwide 
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the not-for-profit reproduction of an out-of-print book for religious 
and educational purposes was not fair use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
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the typical judicial ailments of result-based reasoning, ideological 
bias, and ad hocery.127 For many years, a persistent “market-centred 
approach” to fair use led courts to view it as “an anomalous 
exception to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, applicable only 
in cases of irremediable market failure.”128 In this context, the force 
of fair use was frequently undermined by an undue emphasis on the 
commercial purpose of a use or the effect on the market of the 
plaintiff’s work.129 Even with an explicitly instrumental vision of 
copyright’s purpose, the economic incentive rationale slides easily 
into economic reward, then desert, such that protection of the 
owner’s right effectively becomes the end in itself.130 
 
Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rev’d 268 F.3d 1257(11th Cir. 
2001) (describing Alice Randall’s radical retelling of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone 
with the Wind from the perspective of a slave as “unabated piracy”); see generally, 
Neil W. Netanel, Why has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3, 13-14 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) (arguing, on 
the basis of these and other examples, that lower courts have been receptive to 
private property and piracy rhetoric and thus have narrowly interpreted exceptions 
to copyright holder’s rights). 
 127. See Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and 
Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 566-68 (2006) 
(providing an interesting perspective on ideological bias at work in fair use); 
Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 394-
96 (2016); Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 123, at 718 (noting that 
it would be absurd to expect some pristine standard of legal reasoning in fair use 
cases that no other area of law can provide); Rebecca Tushnet, My Fair Ladies: 
Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
273, 295-300 (2007). 
 128. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, supra note 123, at 734. 
 129. See John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law 
Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 500-03 (2005) (arguing that the courts’ 
approach to fairness and, in particular, the emphasis on the fourth factor privileges 
the inherent property interests of authors in the fruits of their labor over the 
utilitarian goal of progress in the arts). 
 130. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at219, n. 18 (2003) (“As we have 
explained, ‘[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way 
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors’ . . . 
[r]ewarding authors for their creative labor and ‘promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress’ are 
thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in copyright ‘[t]he public good 
fully coincides . . . with the claims . . . of individuals’ . . . [c]opyright law serves 
public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.”); 
see generally Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and 
Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 850 (1993) 
(describing “the tendency to develop robust doctrines of individual moral 
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Arguably, even now, the full force of fair use in the U.S. courts 
remains constrained by its categorization as an affirmative defense,131 
such that the burden falls on the defendant to make out fair use 
(rather than a plaintiff bearing the burden of establishing both prima 
facie infringement and the absence of fair use).132 Ned Snow 
contends that, as originally inherited from the English courts, fair use 
was readily conceived of as a matter of right: 
Like their English counterparts, courts in the U.S. treated the principles of 
fair use as definitional to the issue of infringement: fair-use principles 
determined . . . the scope of a copyright holder’s rights. As definitional to 
infringement, fair use implied that the user held a presumptive right to use 
the copyrighted expression absent a showing otherwise.133 
Indeed, in his authoritative 1847 treatise, George Ticknow Curtis 
described as “one of the great tasks of jurisprudence” administering 
copyright law in a manner that did not curtail “the right to a fair use 
by any writer of all that has been recorded by previous authors.”134 
According to Snow, the idea of fair use as a right receded over the 
course of the twentieth century as U.S. courts shifted the burden of 
proof away from the plaintiff (to prove that a defendant’s use was 
unfair),135 onto the defendant (to prove the fairness of the use).136 
 
entitlement even within the social policy framework”). 
 131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 590 (citing Harper & 
Row, 471 U. S. at 561); H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992); see also Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 132. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. 
REV. 685, 688-91 (2015) (arguing that courts could and should shift the burden to 
the plaintiff in fair use cases); Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, supra 
note 121, at 854, n. 259 (arguing that Campbell erred in asserting that fair use was 
an affirmative defense but noting that this has not unduly burdened defendants 
asserting fair use in practice); Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 
CASE W. RES. L. REV 135, 153 (2012) (acknowledging that where the burden of 
proof lies may not significantly affect the fair use analysis if approached as a 
matter of law but noting that the burden was very relevant in the past when fair use 
was more commonly treated as an issue of fact). 
 133. Snow, supra note 132, at 144. 
 134. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 237 
(1847); Snow, supra note 132, at n. 82. 
 135. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13 (N.D. Cal. 1896) (ruling for the 
defendant-user on the basis that the copyright holder had failed to satisfy his 
burden of proving that the use was unfair); Snow, supra note 132, at 152. 
 136. Snow, supra note 132, at 155-56 (tracing the “paradigm shift” to an 
unsubstantiated statement by Richard DeWolf in his treatise AN OUTLINE OF 
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With that mistake, contends Snow, fair use was changed “from a 
right of speech to an excuse for infringement.”137 The shifting burden 
of proof was itself the natural consequence of a more fundamental 
paradigm shift by which fair use, as widely conceived, morphed from 
a non-infringing use beyond the scope of the owner’s right into a 
technical infringement excusable only on an exceptional basis.138 
Even an affirmative defense can be a matter of right, however,139 
and certain U.S. commentators and judges have argued that fair use 
is properly understood as such. In Bateman v. Mnemonics, Judge 
Birch wrote: “Although the traditional approach is to view ‘fair use’ 
as an affirmative defense, this writer, speaking only for himself, is of 
the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the 
Copyright Act of 1976.”140  More recently, in Lenz v Universal Music 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Justice Birch’s 
characterization of fair use, writing: “even if . . .  fair use is classified 
as an ‘affirmative defense,’ [it] is uniquely situated in copyright law 
so as to be treated differently than traditional affirmative 
defenses.”141 Casting fair use not as an excusable infringement but as 
a non-infringing use authorized by law, the court cited in support 
Section 108(f)(4) of the Copyright Act, which refers to the “the right 
of fair use as provided by section 107.”142 On the basis of the Ninth 
Circuit ruling in Lenz, it can now be argued that “the ability to make 
fair use of works without permission from the rights-holder is an 
 
COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925) that fair use was a “use technically forbidden by the 
law, but allowed as reasonable and customary on the theory that the author must 
have foreseen it and tacitly consented to it”). 
 137. Id. at 137. 
 138. Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and 
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 229 (2009) 
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Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), had 
already introduced the notion that all uses were presumptively unfair unless found 
to be fair). 
 139. See Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 
125, 145-46 (2011) (analogizing the assertion of fair use as an affirmative defense 
to self-defense). I am grateful to Peter Jaszi for an illuminating discussion on this 
point. 
 140. 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 141. 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 142. 17 U.S.C.A. § 108(f)(4) (West 2017) (“Nothing in this section in any way 
affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107.”). 
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affirmative right that is central to copyright law.”143 
It remains fair to say, however, that, on the whole, “the 
conceptualization of fair use as a user right has . . . been little 
judicially recognized in the United States.”144 David Vaver, Niva 
Elkin-Koren and others145 argue in favor of a more explicit embrace 
of “user rights” as such—that is, beyond the general sense that fair 
use is undergirded by the user’s individual right of free speech.146  
Pamela Samuelson writes: 
[I]nsofar as fair use is the mechanism by which First Amendment interests 
of second comers can be vindicated, one would think that just as speakers 
have First Amendment rights, they should have fair use rights, at least as 
to critical commentary. The Canadian Supreme Court has endorsed the 
view that its copyright law’s fair dealing provision creates ‘user rights,’ so 
perhaps U.S. courts should follow that high court’s lead.147 
 
In Israel, meanwhile, where a fair use defense modelled on 
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act was adopted in 2007,148 
attention has similarly turned to the question of whether fair use 
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Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1068 (2011). 
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constitutes a user right. In 2009, in the case of Football Association 
Premier League Ltd v. Anonymous, Justice Agmon-Gonen opined 
that the new statutory fair use provision had established a “user 
right,” and represented a new balance between authors’ rights and 
users’ rights in favor of users.149  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
rejected this position outright, explaining that fair use should, rather, 
be understood simply as a legal defense.150 In the subsequent case of 
Telran Ltd. v Charlton Communications,151 however, the Court 
questioned the defense approach taken in Premier League by noting 
that fair use is not merely a technical defense to infringement but a 
permissible use under the Act. It proceeded to characterize a 
permitted use as a “right” that is granted to the user — an approach 
that was later reaffirmed by the court in Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv.152 
While Israel is rapidly charting its own course in the development of 
fair use jurisprudence, it will offer a fascinating case study on the 
coalescence of a fair dealing history built on the British 1911 Act, a 
statutory move to an open and flexible fair use defense mirroring the 
U.S. model, and, at least potentially, a users’ rights approach drawn 
from the Canadian example.153 
As other nations around the world contemplate making a similar 
move from the British imperial fair dealing law to a U.S.-like fair use 
defense,154 the language of “user rights” is increasingly invoked.155 In 
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copyright in Israel). 
 154. Copyright Act 1987, § 13(2)(a), amended by Act A1420 2012 (Malay.) 
(amending to permit fair dealing for an inclusive and open-ended list of purposes); 
An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 8293, Otherwise 
Known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines”, and for Other 
Purposes, Rep. Act No. 103721, § 185 (2012) (Phil.); Copyright Act, 2006, § 35-
36 (Sing.) (incorporating a 2006 amendment with a fair dealing provision allowing 
the identification of privileged uses on the basis of multiple factors); [Copyright 
Act], Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 12137, Dec. 30, 2013, art. 
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Australia, for example, where no fewer than six government 
inquiries and reviews over the past two decades have recommended 
the adoption of fair use,156 the most recent Productivity Commission 
Report reiterated the recommendation, explicitly framing it as a 
matter of user rights.157 Among the summary of key points appears 
the following: “Introducing the principles–based fair use exception 
as Australia’s system of user rights, would go some way to redress 
the imbalance between copyright holders, consumers and 
intermediate users.”158 
In South Africa, where intellectual property law reform is an 
ongoing project, attention has focused on proposed amendments to 
the Copyright Act to create new exceptions for users.159  Reporting 
for Intellectual Property Watch on a workshop to discuss the revised 
Draft Copyright Amendment Bill of 2015,160 Linda Daniels, 
explained: “Expanding such user rights in South Africa in a core 
purpose of the revision . . . [including] expanding rights to use 
copyrighted works for education, libraries and to provide access for 
people with disabilities.”161 Sean Flynn has argued that “South 
Africa’s law in many respects fails to provide typical user rights that 
exist in other countries,” and hailed the draft bill as presenting a “key 
opportunity” to support both the expansion and the exercise of “user 
 
35(3) (S. Kor.) (exempting fair use, among other things, for reporting, criticism, 
education, and research); Copyright Act, 2016, § 65 (Taiwan); see JONATHAN 
BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 1 (2013); 
Christophe Geiger, Daniel J. Gervais & Martin Senftleben, Understanding the 
“Three-step Test”, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 167, 187 (Daniel 
J. Gervais ed., 2015). 
 155. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, An International 
Acquis: Integrating Regimes and Restoring Balance, in INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 121, 159 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015). 
 156. AUSTL. L. REFORM COMMISSION, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 
61-64 (2013). 
 157. AUSTL. GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ARRANGEMENTS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT 165 (2016). 
 158. Id. at 165. 
 159. Copyright Amendment Bill No. 646 of 2015 ¶ 14 (S. Afr.) (establishing 
general exceptions from the protection of copyright for fair use). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Linda Daniels, Panels Present Importance of Fair Use in South Africa’s 
Draft Copyright Amendment, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Jan. 13, 2017, 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/01/13/panels-present-importance-fair-use-south-
africas-draft-copyright-amendment/. 
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rights.”162 In addition to new exceptions for particular uses, the draft 
bill includes an open-ended (although circumscribed) fair use 
exception that borrows in large part from the wording of Section 107 
of the U.S. Copyright Act.163 Presently, South Africa remains a fair 
dealing jurisdiction,164 but domestic commentators seem increasingly 
inclined to advance the position that fair dealing is a right and not 
merely a defense.165 Tanya Pistorius, for example, argues that “the 
general purpose of copyright exceptions and limitations is to balance 
the public’s right to access copyright works and the economic rights 
of copyright owners.”166 Her view is endorsed by Van der Walt and 
du Bois.167 
In Ireland, the Copyright Review Committee Report of 2013168 
recommended the adoption of a “specifically Irish version” of fair 
 
 162. See Sean Flynn, Copyright Legal and Practical Reform for the South 
African Film Industry, 16 AFR. J. INFO. & COMM. 38, 41, 46 (2015); Sean Flynn, 
Academic Comments: South African Copyright Amendment Bill, 2015, 
INFOJUSTICE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://infojustice.org/archives/35003. 
 163. South Africa Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (with 2015 Proposed Amendments 
in red/strike out) § 12A(2), (4)-(6) (adding Section 12A(2): “(2) Notwithstanding 
any provision of this Act, fair use of work for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, judicial proceedings, professional advice, teaching 
which may include, making multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship or 
research is not an infringement of copyright” (emphasis added). A new subsection 
(5) would set out factors for determining fairness, importing the four U.S. factors 
for consideration. Additional factors in paragraph 5(d) and subsection 6 could, 
however, significantly limit the availability of fair use in certain cases where, e.g., 
the whole work is used, the source or author are not mentioned, or when use is 
made for commercial gain. See also 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 164. Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 12 (S. Afr.) (laying out South Africa’s law that 
copyright will not be infringed by fair dealing). 
 165. AJ van der Walt & M. du Bois, The Importance of the Commons in the 
Context of Intellectual Property, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 31, 47 (2013). 
 166. T. Pistorius, Copyright Law, in LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 143, 211 (H.B. Klopper et al. eds., 2011). 
 167. Van der Walt & du Bois, supra note 166, at 47 (describing Pistorius’ 
position as: “[C]orrespond[ing] exactly with the general purpose of the public 
domain in the sense that intellectual property rights should be construed and 
developed in such a way that intellectual property works would still be readily 
accessible to the public and available for future creative use”); accord Pamela 
Andanda, Copyright Law and Online Journalism: A South African Perspective on 
Fair Use and Reasonable Media Practice, 6 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 411, 
413-14 (2016). 
 168. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS, 
ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, MODERNISING COPYRIGHT 176-77 (2013). 
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use that would be open and flexible but closely tied to existing 
exceptions.169 Particularly interesting, for our purposes, was the 
proposed definition of “lawful user” to be applied to the specific 
context of exceptions under the heading of fair dealing: “In this Part, 
“lawful user” means a person who, whether under a license to 
undertake any act restricted by the copyright in the work or 
otherwise, has a right to use the work, and “lawful use” shall be 
construed accordingly.”170 Indeed, the full package of proposed 
copyright exceptions and safeguards for lawful users (which did not 
ultimately progress into law) was remarkably consistent with a broad 
and positive conception of users’ rights to make use of protected 
works for permitted purposes. 
In India, minor and still restrictive, additions were made to the 
statutory fair dealing provisions by the Copyright (Amendment) Act 
of 2012.171 But it was arguably the Supreme Court of Canada’s fair 
dealing reasons in the Alberta case172 that provided the basis for a 
 
 169. The Copyright and Related Rights Act (Act No. 28/2000), §§ 50(4), 221(2) 
(Ir.) (proposing to change the phrasing “fair dealing means” to “fair dealing 
includes,” thereby creating the flexibility for additional uses to fall within the 
ambit of the defense as technologies evolve). See also COPYRIGHT REVIEW 
COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS, ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, supra 
note 168, at 9, 68-69 (explaining that anti-circumvention provisions would 
explicitly not prevent permitted acts under the proposed amendments while a 
mechanism would allow lawful users to request access, imposing on the copyright 
owner a statutory duty to comply); id. at 62 (justifying the addition of an open-
ended fair dealing defence for “for the purposes of caricature, parody, pastiche, or 
satire, or for similar purposes”); id. at 63 (recommending the introduction of an 
exception for non-commercial user-generated content based on the Canadian 
example); id. at 85-86 (explaining a proposed fair dealing exception for “content-
mining”); id. at 13 (describing the recommendation that any contract term which 
unfairly purports to restrict an exception permitted by the Act should be void). 
 170. COPYRIGHT REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF JOBS, 
ENTERPRISE, AND INNOVATION, supra note 168, at 61 (emphasis added). 
 171. Copyright (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2012, para. 32 (India); see Abhai 
Pandey, Inside Views: The Indian Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 and its 
Functioning So Far, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.ip-
watch.org/2014/10/23/the-indian-copyright-amendment-act-2012-and-its-
functioning-so-far/. 
 172. Alberta v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 2 S.C.R. at 345. See 
Petition of the Society for Promoting Educational Access and Knowledge, 5-6, 
https://spicyip.com/docs/DU%20Photocopying%20case/Application-for-
Intervention-SPEAK.pdf (citing the Supreme Court of Canada in support of the 
proposition that “copyright exceptions ought to be construed more as ‘rights’ or 
‘entitlements’ accruing in favour of users such as educational institutions and not 
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game-changing ruling in the Delhi University photocopying case,173 
which upheld a broad interpretation of the educational use exception. 
The High Court described its interpretation of the provision as “a 
right conferred on a person to use the work of another without any 
compensation.”174 In an op-ed entitled Why Students Need the Right 
to Copy, Shamnad Basheer explained the rights at stake in the 
litigation over India’s educational use exception: 
These exceptions reflect a clear Parliamentary intention to exempt core 
aspects of education from the private sphere of copyright infringement. 
Eviscerating these exceptions at the behest of publishers will strike at the 
very heart of our constitutional guarantee of a fundamental right to 
education for all. In fact, copyright scholars have begun labelling these 
exceptions as “rights” accruing in favor of beneficiaries such as students. 
In CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the Supreme 
Court of Canada endorsed this sentiment noting that: “ . . . The fair 
dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s 
right . . . it must not be interpreted restrictively.”175 
In short, it seems clear that, around the world, as forces mount to 
safeguard copyright limits and expand exceptions in the digital age, 
they find a foothold in the idea of user rights. 
At the level of international lawmaking, admittedly, the language 
of copyright “limits and exceptions” (L&E) persists. Cast as such, of 
course, L&E can be readily misrepresented as antithetical to the 
 
as ‘limited exceptions.’”); see also Univ. of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy 
Servs., (2016) RFA(OS) 81, para. 7-10, 69 (declining to regard the Canadian fair 
dealing case as persuasive authority given the specific requirements of the relevant 
Indian provision). 
 173. Rameshwari Photocopy Servs., RFA(OS) 81, para. 75-80 (ruling in favour 
of the university and the photocopy service by finding no copyright infringement 
in the activities questioned by the publishers in view of the educational use 
exception under section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act of 1957). 
 174. Id. para. 76-77 (noting that the education exception was like the “brilliant 
beating” drum permitted at times to mute the sounds of other provisions of the Act 
for the purposes of the statute’s overall harmony). 
 175. Shamnad Basheer, Why Students Need the Right to Copy, HINDU (June 13, 
2016, 4:48 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-students-need-the-
right-to-copy/article4654452.ece; see also Lawrence Liang, Exceptions and 
Limitations in Indian Copyright Law for Education: An Assessment, 3 LAW & 
DEV. REV. 196, 218 (2010) (arguing for greater exceptions and limitations to 
address the needs of developing countries in general and with respect to the Indian 
constitutional right to education in particular). 
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international legal order — undesirable derogations from the 
normative quest to harmonize robust intellectual property 
protections.176 This perception of L&E as only narrowly permissible 
and broadly frowned upon is reinforced by the tenacious Three-Step 
Test.177 Originally articulated in the Berne Convention, the Three-
Step Test is now an international constraint on nations’ capacity to 
lawfully enact new and flexible copyright exceptions.178  Recent 
efforts to reimagine the meaning and application of the Three-Step 
Test are important and welcome interventions in the international IP 
narrative. The argument can be made that the Three-Step Test, 
properly conceived (or radically reconceived, depending on one’s 
perspective), should advance the cause of proportionality and 
balance within the system.179 What this debate reveals is the 
fundamental error of constructing a lopsided international copyright 
regime wherein only owners have rights worthy of protection.180 
Recent developments suggest that this, too, may be changing.181 The 
 
 176. See Liang, supra note 175, at 219-20. 
 177. Id. at 219 (explaining the Three-Step Test which is a general formula 
applied to determine the legality of copyright exceptions and limitations). 
 178. Berne Convention, supra note 1, at 293 (articulating that permitted 
exemptions from copyright infringement must meet a three factor test: “(1) There 
is a certain special case or use; (2) that does not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of a work; and (3) that does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author.”); see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights art. 1, 9, 13, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 10; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra 
note 1, art. 16. 
 179. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP 
TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC 
COPYRIGHT LAW 295 (2004); Geiger, Gervais & Senftleben, supra note 154, at 
189; Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the 
“Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRIC 
COM. L. 119, 120-21 (2010); Martin Senftleben, The International Three-Step 
Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. 
TECH. & ELECTRIC COM. L. 67, 77-78 (2010). 
 180. See RUTH L. OKEDIJI, THE INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: 
LIMITATIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ix (2006) (arguing that “the concept of the public interest 
in international intellectual property regulation focused disproportionately on just 
one aspect of the public interest, namely securing the optimal provision of 
knowledge goods by granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors”). 
 181. Marrakesh VIP Treaty, supra note 1; Amy Kapczynski, Access to 
Knowledge: A Conceptual Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF 
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successful coming into force of the Marrakesh Treaty182 as well as, 
more broadly, the traction gained by the Access to Knowledge 
movement,183 reflect efforts to re-contextualize copyright exceptions 
in the realm of rights.184 As WIPO (albeit belatedly and slowly) 
responds to the challenge of reorienting the international copyright 
system towards development goals,185 international treaty-making 
efforts in the realm of “copyright limitations and exceptions”186 are 
taking on growing importance. As bilateral, plurilateral, and regional 
agreements continue to ratchet up protection for copyright owners 
and industries, the need for a positively articulated account of L&Es 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 17, 41-42 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski ed., 
2010). 
 182. Marrakesh VIP Treaty, supra note 1. 
 183. See SARAH BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT & ACCESS TO 
KNOWLEDGE 120-22 (2016); Kapczynski, supra note 181, at 41-42. 
 184. See, e.g., Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights), Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/28/57, para. 94 (Dec. 24, 2014) (recognizing the significance of copyright 
limitations and exceptions and the fundamental human right of access to science 
and culture); Tim Wilson (Human Rights Commissioner), Senate Inquiry into the 
Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. 
COMMISSION (Apr. 15, 2015) (warning that, in the absence of an adequate fair use 
defense, respecting copyright can unreasonably restrict the right to freedom of 
expression); Geiger et al., supra note 179, at 121 (declaring that the Three-Step-
Test, which restricts states’ enactment of copyright, should be interpreted in a 
manner that respects the interests deriving from human rights and fundamental 
freedoms); Kevin Smith, Copyright, Open Access and Human Rights, SCHOLARLY 
COMMUNICATIONS @ DUKE (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2015/03/13/copyright-open-access-and-
human-rights (“[I]ntellectual property laws are in tension with the fundamental 
human right of access to science and culture.”). 
 185. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 3-6 (calling for national and international 
intellectual property laws that promote the balance between rights and the public 
domain). 
 186. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Limitations and Exceptions, 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations (last visited Jul. 9, 2017) (Due to the 
development of new technologies and the ever-increasing worldwide use of the 
Internet, it has been considered that the . . . balance between various stakeholders’ 
interests needs to be recalibrated. Limitations and exceptions is an issue considered 
in the agenda of the WIPO Standing Committee for Copyright and Related Rights 
(SCCR) and, recently, its debate has been focused mainly on three groups of 
beneficiaries or activities in relation to exceptions and limitations – on educational 
activities, on libraries and archives and on disabled persons, particularly visually 
impaired persons.). 
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also takes on growing urgency.187 Our understanding and 
presentation of the nature and role of such “exceptions” is therefore 
becoming a critical point of departure for the future of the 
international copyright regime.188 
Tawfik argues that the full implications of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s endorsement of user rights should extend well beyond the 
Canadian context: 
The principles articulated by the Court should also resonate among all 
who are concerned that copyright policy at the international level has 
resulted in a continuous strengthening of the copyright owner’s interest to 
the exclusion of other public policy objectives including access to 
information and the preservation of a flourishing public domain.189 
 
 187. See Matthew Rimmer, Back to the Future: The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, LAWS (forthcoming 2017); Peter 
Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2-3) (noting the importance of 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), currently being negotiated among Australia, China, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, to regional trade and investment agreements); Timothy 
Vollmer, Dozens of organizations call on European Parliament to redouble efforts 
for progressive copyright changes, CREATIVE COMMONS (June 2, 2017), 
https://creativecommons.org/2017/06/02/dozens-organizations-call-european-
parliament-redouble-efforts-progressive-copyright-changes (outlining the concerns 
raised by Creative Commons and sixty organizations in an open letter to European 
lawmakers, calling on “Parliament and Council to spearhead crucial changes that 
promote creativity and business opportunities, enable research and education, and 
protect user rights in the digital market”). 
 188. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty 
for Visually Impaired Persons: Why a Treaty was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 255, 280-82 (2014) (describing the relationship between the “hard 
law” treaty approach taken by WIPO and the recognition of “users rights”); see 
also Aaron Scheinwald, Note, Who Could Possibly be Against a Treaty for the 
Blind?, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 455, 487-90 (2012) (“The 
weight of the ‘gateway drug’ argument is grounded in the fear that the proposed 
treaty is the ‘thin edge of the wedge’ to the users’ rights movement.”). Cf. Silke 
von Lewinski, WIPO’s Discussions on Exceptions and Limitations, in Particular in 
Favour of Visually Impaired Persons, 225 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT 
D’AUTEUR 53, 163-65 (2010) (opposing the solution of a binding international 
treaty and suggesting that solutions instead be found at a national level). 
 189. Myra J. Tawfik, International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’ as a 
“User Right”, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) E-COPYRIGHT BULLET., Apr.-June 2005, at 6-7 
[hereinafter Tawfik, International Copyright Law and ‘Fair Dealing’]. 
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Based on the Canadian experience, it might reasonably be 
concluded that advocates for expanding and entrenching copyright 
limitations and exceptions internationally would do well to line up 
behind the concept of “user rights.”190 This could be true on a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, but also at the international level, 
where a commitment to user rights as such could both validate and 
mandate national domestic efforts to recalibrate copyright’s balance 
to the benefit of users and the public.191 Currently, such efforts must 
withstand accusations that they contravene the Three-Step Test and 
international obligations, while the steady expansion of owner rights 
meets no such barrier in our international copyright regime.192 As 
such, as Margaret-Ann Wilkinson observes, “even for Canadians . . . 
in light of the international developments involving copyright 
holders’ rights it seems very important to ensure that the rights of 
users are clearly internationally enshrined as well.”193 The concern is 
that, without some formal textual instantiation of user rights in the 
international regime, future governments in pursuit of external trade-
related goals may be pressured to derogate from established domestic 
protections for users.194 The international recognition of “users 
rights,” it seems reasonable to assert, might provide a more reliable 
shield for users against the incursion of copyright.195 
The discussion that follows does not seek to dispute or undermine 
the significance of developments in the Canadian copyright law 
around the judicial and broad endorsement of “user rights,” nor does 
it advocate against the assertion of user rights internationally. Indeed, 
it takes as its premise that there is a pressing need to develop global 
copyright norms around copyright limits and exceptions—norms that 
 
 190. Id. at 14-15. 
 191. See id. at 7-8. 
 192. See Myra Tawfik, International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights?, in 
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 66, 77-78 
(Geist ed., 2005) (“[T]he three-step test does not undermine the discretion enjoyed 
by national legislatures to enact limitations and exceptions so long as they remain 
consistent with the Berne Convention and conform to the objectives the test was 
formulated to achieve.”). 
 193. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 10. 
 194. See id. (noting that, if user rights are not so enshrined, “future Canadian 
governments [may] be pressured by future international trade possibilities to use 
legislative power to derogate from the level of users’ rights protection that is 
currently in place in Canadian law”). 
 195. See id. at 10, 13. 
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can be “effectively translated into a credible system that 
appropriately values author and users rights.”196 However, In what 
follows, I will caution against the attractive assumption that “rights” 
are all users need in order to cure the ills of an over-expansive 
copyright system. Rights can only do so much; and in some respects, 
I will suggest, blind reliance upon the rhetoric of rights could do 
more harm than good to the overarching cause of advancing the 
public interest and protecting the public domain. 
III. THE ROLE AND RISKS OF USERS’ RIGHTS 
As we have seen, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Théberge197 produced a shift away from the owner-centric approach 
to copyright that had characterized Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. It 
did not, however, produce a departure from rights-based reasoning.198 
The Théberge decision acknowledged the role of the public in 
copyright policy, but nevertheless invoked natural rights-based 
language to explain the nature of the “balance” sought “[A] balance 
between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just 
reward for the creator (or more accurately, to prevent someone other 
than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be 
generated).”199 
The balance requires that we first “recogniz[e] the creator’s 
rights.”200 It should be no surprise, then, that the Théberge balance 
 
 196. P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT 50 
(2008), https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/limitations_exceptions_
copyright.pdf. 
 197. Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, 
361-63 (Can.) (rejecting the argument that the ink-transfer process constituted an 
infringement of a copyright owner’s economic rights because there was no 
“reproduction without multiplication” of the total number of copies). 
 198. Id. at 337-38. 
 199. Id. at 355. 
 200. Id. (“The proper balance . . . lies not only in recognizing the creator’s 
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature.”) (emphasis added); see 
CCH Canadian v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 10, 
23 (Can.) (quoting Théberge, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, paras. 30-31) (asserting that one 
objective of the Copyright Act is to obtain “a just reward for the creator”). From a 
Lockean perspective, the concept of a “just reward” would amount to a “right,” and 
generally, it is likely to be understood in this way. The language of “just reward” is 
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has since been explained in distinctly Lockean language: “The 
person who sows must be allowed to reap what is sown, but the 
harvest must ensure that society is not denied some benefit from the 
crops.”201 Courts purporting to implement the Théberge copyright 
balance can still be guided by a conviction that “to deprive authors of 
the fruits of their labour is unjust.”202  There is, in other words, 
nothing inherent in the idea of a balanced copyright system or a 
public interest purpose that necessarily disrupts the rights-based 
rationale for copyright ownership. 
Rather than an instrument of broader social good, the copyright 
system remains tethered, in this account, to authorial claims of right, 
necessarily limiting the power of the public interest to define and 
delimit the copyright owner’s claim.203 Individual rights are not 
subject to—and so will not cede to—the interests of the public at 
 
therefore likely to permit the continued prevalence of a Lockean approach to 
copyright. 
 201. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2002] CAF 187, para. 
23 (Can.); see Teresa Scassa, Interests in the Balance, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 41, 44 (Geist ed., 2005) (citing CCH 
Canadian Ltd., para. 23) (describing the use of this Lockean approach as “an 
awkward amalgamation” of utilitarian and natural rights models). 
 202. Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2004 CarswellOnt 4015, para. 51 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.) (WL). 
 203. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (guarding against 
“spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share the fruits of the efforts 
of a sole author”) (emphasis added); Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 
539, 546 (1985) (“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure 
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”) (emphasis 
added); Triangle Publ’n v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (describing fair use as a balance between “the author’s right to 
compensation for his work” and the “public’s interest in the widest possible 
dissemination of ideas and information”); Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. 
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (displaying concern for protecting 
the creator’s “substantial investment of time, money and labor”); Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities 
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered”) (emphasis added); 
Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-40 (1918) (declaring 
that when two parties seek to profit in the same field using the same material, that 
material is “quasi property” attempting to “reap where it has not sown” constitutes 
“appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown”); Wheaton v. Peters, 
33 U.S. 591, 669-70 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“The great principle on 
which the author’s rights rests, is, that it is the fruit or production of his own 
labour, and which may, by the labour of the faculties of the mind, establish a right 
of property.”). 
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large.204 But they may be limited by the competing rights of others.205 
Herein lies the power and the appeal of “user rights”: the concept of 
the user’s right has provided much needed ballast for users in the 
balancing act that courts are now asked to perform.206 
A. THE PROBLEM WITH THE COPYRIGHT BALANCE 
The label of right, as we have seen, proves useful in ensuring that 
the interests of users are not simply set aside in the face of the 
owner’s claim.207 Rather, with the label of right appended, the 
interests of the user are sufficiently weighted on the proverbial 
copyright scale to effectively limit the rights of authors.208 There are 
risks, however, that come with subscribing to this notional balancing 
of creator and user rights. As Laura Murray has argued, “the 
metaphor of balance has its limits because it posits users and creators 
as distinct entities placed on either side of a fulcrum.”209 Thus 
conceptualized, users and creators have opposing interests at play in 
what is essentially a zero-sum game: what is good for the creator 
(more protection) is bad for the user (less freedom to use); and what 
is good for the user (freedom to use) is bad for the creator (less 
protection).210 
The flaw in this vision is twofold. First, creators and users occupy 
separate categories while in fact, of course, all creators are users, and 
all users are creators.211 Second, the rights of individuals in each 
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category are presumed to be at odds with one another, while the 
operative assumption justifying copyright is that the interests of 
creators and users should align in the encouragement and 
dissemination of works.212 The complexity of the stakeholder 
interests necessarily at play in the copyright system (the diverse 
interests of authors, owners, users, and the wider public) may be 
helpfully simplified by the binary scales on which they are forced to 
compete, but they are also flattened to the point of fiction.213 To 
make invisible the complex relationships implicated by the processes 
of creative cultural exchange is to remove the dimension in which we 
can perceive what is truly at stake.214 Shared and divergent values, 
competing and complimentary interests, shifting roles and 
relationships—these are all reduced to commensurate weights to be 
traded off against one another. 
The problem is not unique to copyright, but rather is inherent to 
the over-simplifying and complexity-concealing notion of balance 
that is increasingly prevalent in our liberal legal imagination. Julian 
Sanchez puts his finger on the problem: 
Perhaps the most obvious problem with balancing metaphors is that they 
suggest a relationship that is always, by necessity, zero sum: If one side 
rises, the other must fall in exact proportion . . . 
In my own area of study, the familiar trope of ‘balancing privacy and 
security’ is a source of constant frustration to privacy advocates, because 
while there are clearly sometimes tradeoffs between the two, it often 
seems that the zero-sum rhetoric of ‘balancing’ leads people to view them 
as always in conflict.215 
As Kim Weatherall has noted, the “subtle influence of framing”216 
 
such law is, in general, a good idea. That statement, however, doesn’t end the 
discussion; it begins it. A theory of authors’ rights must be informed by a theory of 
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 212. See generally Julien Sanchez, The Trouble with “Balance” Metaphors, 
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such policy questions as balancing acts is just as powerful—and, it is 
implied, just as unsatisfactory—in the copyright domain.217 The 
presentation of users’ rights as inherently in conflict with creators’ 
rights reinforces a fundamentally flawed understanding of the latter: 
the zero-sum balancing act suggests that the rights of copyright 
owners exist in spite of, and in constant tension with, the rights of 
those who would use their works.218 Within this frame, it becomes 
impossible to see the rights of creators as existing through the 
public’s interest in the work rather than against it. In turn, then, the 
frame brings into sharp relief the creators’ rights as individual 
entitlements—ends in themselves—independent of the rights of users 
or the interests of the public at large.219 This is not a baseline 
assumption compatible with strong users’ rights, broad fair dealing, 
or an expansive public domain. 
In addition to creating the unhelpful illusion of an inevitable trade-
off between creators and users as distinct entities, the metaphor of 
balancing rights serves to conceal the inadequacy of our analytic 
reasoning. Sanchez’ critique is also apt in this regard: 
 
[O]ften the imaginary scales conjured by balancing talk conceal the fact 
that we don’t have a clear sense of what [the] shared dimension is 
supposed to be, what single quantity is supposed to serve as our standard 
for comparing such heterogeneous goods . . . 
This may be why so many legal opinions employing ‘balancing tests’ feel 
so thin, and so many arguments about where to ‘strike the right balance’ 
between competing values founder. The metaphor assumes a lot of 
analytic background work that hasn’t actually been done—and conceals 
the fact that it still needs to be.220 
The balance metaphor in the copyright domain masks the reality 
that we have no agreed upon “shared dimension”—no uniform 
measure against which to weigh the heterogeneous interests and 
incommensurable considerations that we are haphazardly tossing 
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onto the copyright scale.221 Balancing analyses are necessarily based 
on value judgments about the relative importance of rights and 
interests.222 Whether a balance can be said to be have been struck 
depends only on the relative weight that the decision-maker 
attributes to the interests that she puts in the balance; as such, the 
balancing exercise can be no more than a subjective evaluation of 
who and what should prevail.223 Without the masking metaphor, this 
much would at least be clear. So too would be the shortcomings of 
our “analytic background work”: what are the multiple diverse and 
overlapping values captured within the monolithic idea of the 
author’s right or the public interest? What is the single standard 
against which we should measure the competing rights and interests 
of authors and users, owners, and the public (progress, utility, justice, 
equality, democracy, self-fulfillment, agency, cultural creativity, the 
social good)? Recourse to the self-rationalizing rhetoric of balance 
simply side-steps the analytical inquiry essential to purpose-oriented 
lawmaking. 
Notwithstanding the flaws inherent in the metaphor of balance, it 
is nothing short of ubiquitous in today’s liberal legal order.224 With 
so many stakeholder claims at play in the copyright context, 
resistance to the frame of balance may be futile.225 Indeed, if the 
alternative to a “balanced” regime is one aimed only or primarily at 
the protection of copyright owners, resisting the balancing rhetoric 
would also be self-defeating for anyone hoping to advance the 
interests of users and the public.226 If we are prepared to embrace the 
metaphor of balance on such logic—and assuming that authors’ 
“rights” are already and will remain on the metaphorical scale—it 
seems reasonable to conclude that users will be better off with 
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“rights” on the scale than mere “interests.” As Frederick Schauer 
reminds us with regard to the balancing of rights and interests: 
“When rights are on one side of the equation, there is a presumption 
in favour of the right[.]”227 Rights, in other words, have “a thumb on 
the scale” in their favor. 228 
There are, however, a few more cautionary notes to sound about 
the conceptual move from a rights-interests balance to a rights-rights 
balance in the copyright context. 
B. THE PROBLEM WITH USERS’ RIGHTS AS BALLAST IN THE 
BALANCE 
Relying on user rights as ballast on the public side of the copyright 
balance could potentially overwhelm—and perhaps ultimately 
displace—the weight of the public interest as such. While the public 
interest was a critical consideration in the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s CCH ruling and featured prominently in the Court’s 
articulation of copyright’s balance, the recognition of user rights has 
potentially precipitated a move towards rights-based balancing in 
copyright law.229 
Iddo Porat explains the shift from interest-based to rights-based 
balancing, in connection with American constitutional jurisprudence, 
as the move from “early balancing,” which was progressive and anti-
formalist, to “modern balancing” wherein rights are preferred over 
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policy.230 Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, is identified as one of 
the leaders of the early balancing methodology in American 
jurisprudence. He resisted the idea of judges logically deducing 
answers from conceptions of absolute right in favor of recognizing 
judges’ duty to “[weigh] considerations of social advantage.”231 In 
Hudson Country Water Co. v. McCarter, Justice Holmes wrote: “All 
rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. 
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy 
which are other than those on which the particular right is 
founded[.]”232 Property rights, in this case, were to be balanced 
against conflicting interests.233 Porat argues that balancing in this 
sense was a reaction against the pro-rights traits of Classicist 
constitutional jurisprudence, “lowering absolute rights to the status 
of balanceable interests” and “rejecting a right-based or natural 
rights-based, automatic preference for the right over the interest.”234 
The constitutional Classicists had, in Roscoe Pound’s words, relied 
on “an individualist conception of justice, which exaggerate[d] the 
importance of property and of contract [and] exaggerate[d] private 
right at the expense of public right.”235 Early balancing tests thus 
resisted the formalism of this strong rights jurisprudence, employing 
interest-based balancing to assess the relative worth and importance 
of competing social interests rather than privileging the individual 
interests masquerading behind the claim of right.236 
Porat proceeds to explain how, with the rise of civil and political 
rights, the Progressive movement famously split over the position of 
rights, and therefore over the nature of judicial balancing.237 A new 
type of “modern balancing” arose, consistent with the pro-rights 
rhetoric and adapted to be rights-based; it “gave rights a preferred 
position in the balancing process.”238 Porat charts the rise and fall of 
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the modern balancing approach in tandem with shifting values 
around judicial activism, but notes that balancing rhetoric is once 
again on the rise in US constitutional law: “The boundaries between 
the two types of balancing may have been blurred somewhat, but one 
can still identify today balancing that comes hand in hand with 
policy-oriented and interest-based argumentation, and balancing that 
comes hand in hand with a strong rhetoric of rights.”239 
In the copyright context, my first concern with the insertion of 
“users’ rights” onto the metaphorical balancing scales is the 
possibility that, rather than disrupting the notion of the author’s right 
and using balancing to reveal the interest-based nature of authors’ 
rights claims, the copyright balance will come to look more like a 
rights-based balance in which formal rights compete on a scale that 
purports to weigh them objectively and prioritize them accordingly. 
The risk is that we lose our sense of the balancing mechanism as “a 
tool for maximizing social interests, and for demystifying a 
heightened rights rhetoric, which is . . . a cover-up for moral and 
political predispositions.”240 With the shift to rights-based balancing, 
the real disruptive capacity of a policy-oriented copyright balance 
could be significantly weakened. 
With respect to the balancing metaphor as such, Porat identifies a 
further conceptual tension at play in the deployment of balance, 
which seems closely tied to whether it is interest-based or rights-
based, pragmatist or formalist in nature.241 The balance itself may be 
defined differently depending on how the balancing act is conceived: 
if the weighing scales metaphor simply suggests an exercise in 
comparing relative values, the act of balancing looks like an intuitive 
and subjective process of evaluation and comparison; if the scale 
metaphor alludes to finding the actual weight of two or more objects, 
then the act of balancing appears more like a purportedly exact, 
scientific and objective exercise in measurement.242 Paul Kahn 
explains: “The metaphor [of balancing] is ambiguous. It describes 
both a process of measuring competing interests to determine which 
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is ‘weightier’ and a particular substantive outcome characterized as a 
‘balance’ of competing interests.”243 If rights have an ostensibly 
objective measure, and the weightier right will win, the rights-based 
balance ceases to look like a judicial exercise in the evaluation and 
comparison of possible outcomes and more like a formalistic 
determination of the objective value of competing rights.244  In the 
copyright context, the latter approach is more likely to produce an 
assessment of the relative importance of protecting owners’ rights 
over users’ rights, rather than permitting a careful comparison of the 
social and economic advantages or disadvantages of privileging one 
party’s interests over the other in a particular context. 
Finally, it should be noted that with the addition of users’ rights 
onto the copyright’s metaphorical scale, there is a risk that the 
individualized owner-versus-user balance subsumes (or even 
supplants) the author-versus-public balance.245 The individualization 
of interests accompanies the more formalist rights-rhetoric, with the 
possible result that broader community-based interests will come to 
weigh less or even to be knocked off the scale.  With the shift from 
interest-based to rights-based balancing there occurs a shift from 
community-oriented to individual-oriented analysis—and with this 
shift, the public purposes of the copyright system are at risk of 
receding from view.246 
Laura Murray implicitly captures this concern and more when she 
worries about supplanting the concept of “fair dealing” with the idea 
of a “user right:” 
[T]he Supreme Court elevated fair dealing to the status of a ‘user’s right.’ 
And yet, is not ‘user’s right’ a less capacious and more constraining 
category than ‘fair dealing’? ‘User’ puts the action in a combative light 
(user vs. creator/owner), and ‘right’ contains us within an individual 
rights discourse. Dealing . . . is relational and process based; use seems 
terminal and finite and individual. Fairness is a discourse of practice; right 
is a discourse of law.  . . . [A]s a term [fair dealing] is more alive in our 
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culture than user’s rights are.247 
From the perspective of the copyright minimalist, keen to restrain 
copyright and to ensure a broad scope for fair and lawful uses of 
copyright protected works, it makes perfect sense that the rise of user 
rights in the Canadian case law should look like a cause for 
celebration. Certainly, the rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada 
have solidified the notion that users and the public have rights in 
relation to intellectual works.248 Moreover, that notion has since been 
employed to good effect in rulings that have typically safeguarded a 
reasonably large and liberal fair dealing defense and engaged in a 
careful, comparative balancing exercise to keep copyright claims in 
check.249 Indeed, it is important to note that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s articulation of the user right kept the broader public interest 
very much in view, casting user rights as one means by which to 
further copyright’s public interest ends.250 
There are, however, reasons to be cautious about the rise of users’ 
rights rhetoric even for those who applaud these developments in 
favor of users. We should be wary of the framing analysis that asks 
us to balance owners’ rights against users’ rights because, to 
summarize, the balancing metaphor risks: wrongly separating 
creators and owners from users and the public, when in fact the same 
 
 247. Id. at 351. 
 248. Michael Geist, Copyright Users’ Rights in Canada Hits Ten: The Tenth 
Anniversary of the CCH Decision, http://canliiconnects.org/en/
commentaries/27511 (last visited Sept. 19. 2017). 
 249. Id. See also supra Section II. C. (describing cases in Canada that have 
endorsed the language of “user rights”). But see United Airlines, Inc. v. 
Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616, para. 111 (acknowledging the “importance of balance 
between the rights of creators or authors and those of users” but going on to reject 
a fair dealing defence for a critical parody); Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency 
v. York University, 2017 FC 669, para. 251 (stating that ‘fair dealing’ is a positive 
user right,” but going on to find that the University’s Fair Dealing Guidelines did 
not satisfy the requirements of fair dealing for the purposes of education, research 
or private study). 
 250. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell 
Canada, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, paras. 9-11 (Can.) (“Théberge reflected a move away 
from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive right of 
authors and copyright owners to control how their works were used in the 
marketplace . . . [It] focused attention instead on the importance copyright plays in 
promoting the public interest . . . CCH confirmed that users’ rights are an essential 
part of furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act.”). 
2017] GLOBALIZING USER RIGHTS-TALK 53 
people (all of us) occupy these various roles; establishing a zero-sum 
equation whereby a gain on one side wrongly appears to be a loss on 
the other, with the political consequences that follow; reinforcing a 
more formalist, rights-based understanding of the copyright system 
that displaces an interest-based evaluation of competing claims; and 
reducing shared community goals and public interests into 
individualized claims of right, thereby threatening to obscure the 
very social values and interests that justify the copyright system.251 
And so, at this critical juncture in the development of copyright law, 
as we struggle with the extension and enforcement of copyright law 
in new technological contexts at a global scale, it may be wise to ask 
ourselves whether “users’ rights” hold the key to restraining 
copyright—or if our reliance on users’ rights will only, ultimately, 
strengthen copyright’s overreaching grasp. A handful of small 
victories and some carefully circumscribed concessions for rights-
bearing users could come at the cost of reinforcing a rights-based 
copyright regime, shifting the recognized purpose of the copyright 
system towards the protection of individual rights rather than the 
encouragement of authorship for the benefit of society as a whole. If 
rights-based reasoning has always, thus far, justified the incessant 
expansion of copyright’s domain, might we, in our eagerness to stand 
behind the user’s right, unwittingly be inviting more of the same? 
IV. BEYOND COPYRIGHT: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
RIGHTS? 
As I have suggested, the conceptual and strategic risks associated 
with the escalation of rights rhetoric in copyright law are not alien to 
other fields of law, from privacy to contract to constitutional theory. 
The concerns I have sketched above resonate with longstanding 
debate in legal and political theory around the way that “rights” have 
been deployed in our liberal legal order, and to whose advantage. 
While the legal history and scholarship here is vast, my purpose in 
this section is only to outline some core objections to the rise of 
rights most closely associated with the school of Critical Legal 
Studies.252  We will then briefly consider how these rights critiques 
have been both acknowledged and refuted in the feminist and critical 
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race schools of thought, wherein activists and theorists faced a 
familiar dilemma: how to leverage rights claims to advance equality 
without succumbing to the totalizing logic of liberal rights and its 
flaws.253 
A. THE RIGHTS CRITIQUE: REIFICATION AND RHETORIC 
The rise of the anti-formalist interest-balancing approach 
described above was attributed in large part to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, who was, of course, a leading voice in the American Legal 
Realist movement.254 The Realists sought to reveal the fallacy of 
judicial rule-bound formalism, insisting instead that every case 
involving conflicting claims of right could be resolved only by 
making a political and moral choice about which claim to 
privilege.255 Simply put, all law is policy.256  Rights were a central 
target of the realist critique: “There will be a right if, and only if, the 
court finds for the plaintiff or declares the statute unconstitutional. 
What the court cites as the reason for the decision—the existence of 
a right—is, in fact, only the result.”257 
Fast-forward to the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the 
Realist torch was carried forth by Critical Legal Scholars under the 
banner of Critical Legal Studies (CLS).258  The critique of liberalism 
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was one of the unifying standpoints of CLS, and core to this was the 
contention that liberalism’s claim “to resolve the persistent and 
systematic conflict between individual and social interests through 
the mechanism of objective rules . . . [and] procedural justice is 
inherently flawed.”259 Ultimately, they suggested that the law’s 
mediation between conflicting interests can offer only a pragmatic 
response to social conflict, producing “a set of results which reflects 
the unequal distribution of power and resources whilst claiming to 
act in the name of a set of universal social values.”260 
Like the Realists before them, the CLS scholars took a radical 
political stance aimed at delegitimizing liberal legal theory by 
exposing the “received ideals” and presuppositions that informed 
judicial decision-making.261 Central to this assault on deductive legal 
logic was the critique of rights.262 Duncan Kennedy, a leading 
proponent of the so-called Frankfurt school, presents the critique by 
providing an account of the role of rights in American legal 
consciousness, how one might come to “lose faith in the coherence 
of rights discourse,” and why one might critique rights in spite of the 
“unpleasantness” of doing so.263 The critique is far richer and more 
compelling than I can do justice to here,264 but for our purposes I 
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mean to pull out a few insights that may move the analysis along. 
Kennedy describes how, against the background of a nostalgic 
reinterpretation of the triumphant 1960s, the liberal left embraced 
rights and rights-rhetoric, while the CLS critique of rights appeared 
politically perverse.265 Rights came to play the powerful role, in 
political discourse, of mediating between factual (objective, 
scientific) judgments and value judgments (subjective preferences): 
[Rights-based political discourse] presuppose[s] a basic distinction 
between rights argument and other kinds of normative argument. The 
point of an appeal to a right, the reason for making it, is that it can’t be 
reduced to a mere ‘value judgment’ that one outcome is better than 
another . . . Rights reasoning, in short, allows you to be right about your 
value judgments, rather than just stating ‘preferences.’266 
This role for rights depends on the idea, first, that rights are 
‘universal’ insofar as they derive from needs, values or preferences 
that everyone shares or ought to share; and second, that they are 
‘factoid’ in the sense that they exist as entities in legal reasoning- the 
recognition of which leads ineluctably to particular rules or 
conclusions.267 Together, these attributes permit rights to mediate 
between the interests of particular groups in society and the interests 
of the whole, Kennedy explains: 
When groups are in the process of formation, coming to see themselves as 
having something in common that is a positive rather than a negative 
identity, the language of rights provides a flexible vehicle for formulating 
interests and demands . . . New groups can enter the discourse of 
American politics with the expectation that they will at least be 
understood, if they can fit themselves to this template.268 
The effect is that rights mediate not only between facts and values, 
but also between law and politics.269 Legal rules that recognize 
accepted rights appear non-partisan, transcending the left-right 
divide.270 The result is an “empowerment effect”271 sought and 
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embraced by both the left and the right, allowing both camps to 
claim “correctness” and rationality in their legal arguments. Rights 
talk, as a discourse, invokes a set of presuppositions about law, legal 
reasoning and reality (objective truth) upon which those who use it 
can now rely. 
The role played by rights-discourse, as described by Kennedy, 
captures quite perfectly, I believe, the role that has been played by 
rights discourse in the copyright domain.272 Our copyright system 
had, at least from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, been built 
upon a foundational perception of a “natural right” of authors—what 
Kennedy might call “an existing outside right”—whose “existence” 
does not appear to depend on legal enactment, but which has been 
translated into positive law.273 In fact, as Martha Woodmansee has 
argued, the recognition of this apparently pre-existing right was itself 
“the product of the rise in the eighteenth century of a new group of 
individuals: writers who sought to earn their livelihood from the sale 
of their writings.”274 
Over the course of the twentieth century, with the rise of a 
formalist British judiciary committed to upholding private rights, the 
abstract demands of the public interest became secondary or 
peripheral to law’s task.275 Users of copyright protected works did 
not constitute a cohesive group with shared needs and interests, but 
rather were cognizable primarily as sole defendants before the courts, 
individual wrong-doers and free-riders whose private actions invaded 
the established rights of authors and copyright owners.276 What has 
now happened in the twenty-first century—no doubt attributable in 
large part to the rapid evolution of network technologies, combined 
with the intrusion of copyright norms into the daily lives of average 
citizens—is the rise of users as a group “having something in 
common that is a positive rather than a negative identity[.]”277 Rather 
than a diverse array of individualized infringers, users have emerged 
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as a galvanized community with shared interests, demanding 
recognition and protection.278 What naturally follows, as Kennedy 
describes, is the turn to rights-talk as a “vehicle for formulating 
interests and demands” in a way that will “fit” with the current legal 
and political discourse.279 
By employing the rhetoric of rights, the interests of users who 
wish to deal freely and lawfully with protected works cannot be 
reduced to mere personal preferences, nor can the demands of 
would-be users be dismissed as self-serving preferences. If 
established, user rights can assume the role of legal entities 
(“factoids”) necessitating certain objectively correct conclusions 
about what constitutes a lawful dealing.280 Users’ claims fit the 
template of other copyright claims, readily understood and deserving 
of equal recognition. Normative claims about what users should be 
permitted to do freely, and the limits to which copyright claims ought 
to be subject, metamorphose into a different kind of proposition 
about the obligation of owners and law-makers to respect rights.281 In 
these various ways, it is undoubtedly “meaningful” to speak of legal 
rights with reference to fair dealing and other copyright exceptions. 
Kennedy explains, in general terms: “The appeal to a rule cast in the 
form of a right, or to a value understood to be represented by a right, 
may produce the experience of closure: given this legalized right, 
you can’t think of a good reason why the plaintiff shouldn’t lose the 
case.”282 
Similarly, we might reason, given the users’ right to deal fairly 
with the work for the purposes of research or private study, there was 
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no good reason in cases such as CCH, Bell, or Alberta for the 
plaintiff copyright owner or collective not to lose the case.283 
Recognition of the user’s right could foreclose the issue without the 
need for further justification or debate. The point that we might take 
from the CLS critique of rights, however, is that the assertion of a 
user right is really no different in nature than the assertion of any 
other normative argument based on politics, morality, or subjective 
values about what ought to be—that is, arguments about what uses of 
protected works ought to be permitted.284 
If legal argument is open-textured and indeterminate, so too is the 
legal process of defining what the user right actually “is.” Whether 
photocopying law reports for lawyers, streaming 30 seconds of a 
musical work, or distributing photocopied book chapters to students 
“is” the exercise of a “user right” depends whether it is judged to be 
fair dealing for a lawful purpose.285 The circularity of the logic 
should be apparent: an activity is not fair dealing because it is a 
user’s right; it is only said to be a user’s right if it is adjudged to be 
fair dealing.286 The judicial decision to regard any particular activity 
as fair dealing is no more or less objectively rational or correct just 
because the legal question has been reframed as a question about 
whether the activity is or is not a matter of right. 
The indeterminacy of the user right means that the right is doing 
less work than we might think: if the right does not determine the 
outcome of a particular case, it merely translates the court’s 
conclusion into rights-talk.287 The CLS “indeterminacy thesis” also 
suggests that the power of the recognized right to truly act as a 
bulwark against subsequent change is more limited than we might 
hope or realize:288 the right is not, after all, a stable entity that can be 
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reliably passed from one use or user to the next.289 While the 
invocation of user rights might appear to substantively ground an 
expansive interpretation of the fair dealing defense in one case, the 
very same rhetorical lip-service to rights might accompany a narrow 
interpretation in the next.290 Ultimately, rights-talk is just that. As 
Mark Tushnet explains, “[t]o some extent the critique of rights serves 
as a simple caution against overestimating the significance of legal 
victories.”291 
Courts’ reliance upon the metaphorical copyright “balance” to 
reconcile conflicting rights-claims only emphasizes the point that 
legal arguments about rights reduce down to policy arguments about 
what ought to be.292 Balancing tests, Kennedy asserts, “render rights 
argument indistinguishable from open-ended policy discourse[.]”293 
The internal critique of rights, he explains, 
reduces legal rights reasoning to policy reasoning by showing that it is 
necessary to balance one side’s asserted right against the other side’s . . . 
[W]hat determines the balance is not a chain of reasoning from a right or 
even from two rights, but a third procedure, one that in fact involves 
considering open-textured arguments from morality, social welfare, 
expectations, and institutional competence and administrability.294 
As we have seen, rights arguments have significant meaning and 
effect in copyright law, and have traditionally been wielded to the 
benefit of owners, whose claims to right have lent “closure” and a 
sense of objective correctness to rulings in favor of the 
owner/plaintiff claiming infringement.295 The claim of countervailing 
user rights is no less meaningful, and may similarly bring closure and 
objective correctness to rulings in the user/defendant’s favor. The 
ostensibly depoliticizing and empowering nature of the claim to right 
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has much to offer users, and can be asserted as a means of 
recalibrating the metaphorical balancing scales of copyright justice to 
produce greater equilibrium.296 But the critique of rights outlined 
here undermines the rational basis for regarding rights arguments as 
essentially different from any other normative argument that might 
be made in defense of the user. At the moment when we resort to 
“balancing” a user’s right against a conflicting owner’s right, we 
could just as well argue that the user’s activity ought to constitute 
non-infringing fair dealing on general moral, political or utilitarian 
grounds.297 The point becomes clearer when we insert the relevant 
copyright claims into the following passage by Kennedy: 
The upshot . . . is that the advocates confront the judge with two plausible 
but contradictory chains of rights reasoning, one proceeding from the 
plaintiff’s right [to exclusive control over the copyright work] and the 
other from the defendant’s [right to use the work fairly]. Yes, the 
[copyright owner has exclusive] rights, but the [user has user rights] . . .  
Sometimes the judge more or less arbitrarily endorses one side over the 
other; sometimes she throws in the towel and balances. The lesson . . . is 
that the question involved cannot be resolved without resort to policy, 
which in turn makes the resolution open to ideological influence . . . 
[O]nce it is shown that the case requires a balancing of conflicting rights 
claims, it is implausible that it is the rights themselves, rather than the 
‘subjective’ or ‘political’ commitments of the judges, that are deciding the 
outcome.298 
The problem, according to Critical Legal Scholars, is not only that 
rights are indeterminate, but also that they are potentially 
“regressive.”299 “Winning” a right in a court case may not advance a 
political goal, but worse, it might actually impede a political goal.300 
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In the copyright context, the concern is that the judicial embrace of 
user rights will actually backfire to slow our progress towards a 
fairer copyright regime.301 As Laura Murray has warned, within the 
frame of a user right, what can constitute a relevant use suddenly 
seems more terminal and finite and individual;302 the breadth of what 
is fair constricts to what can be claimed within the scope of the 
individual user’s right.303 As the battle between dueling rights-claims 
takes hold, efforts will be made to constrict that right to its baseline 
requirements. At the same time, the claim that users’ rights are duly 
recognized within the copyright system will produce “a narrative of 
legitimation,” a language for concluding that the system is fair, 
objective and unbiased.304 (In reality, of course, copyright limitations 
and exceptions as currently defined can do little to off-set the sheer 
scope of copyright protection or to hold at bay the powerful forces 
that demand it.) 
If we are content to baldly assert users’ rights as shorthand to get 
us where we want to go, we risk reducing larger normative claims 
about the necessary limits of copyright protection down to bare 
propositions about individual entitlements and duties.305 The reliance 
on rights rhetoric therefore threatens to impoverish our discourse 
around the public interest and the social values at stake in the 
copyright context. The work of another prominent US critic of rights, 
Mary Ann Glendon, is revealing in this regard. In a powerful attack 
on America’s “shallow rights talk,”306 Glendon decries the resort to 
“mere assertion over reason-giving,”307 arguing: “Our rights talk, in 
its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social 
conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, 
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accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”308 
Perhaps, in the absence of lurking rights claims, we might be freed 
up to genuinely turn our minds to the question of how much 
copyright protection is really necessary and justified in furtherance 
of our shared social goals. Instead, we clamor to have our rights 
recognized by and protected against one another.309 While the stated 
objectives of our copyright system require a teleological lens, claims 
to right focus on origins and present-day entitlements.310 In terms that 
ring true in today’s copyright climate, Glendon warns against the 
“present-mindedness”311 of rights talk as an obstacle to genuine 
communication and public deliberation. 
Also resonant in the copyright context is Glendon’s critique of 
rights talk as missing a “dimension of sociality.”312 Remarking on the 
“relentless individuality” of our rights rhetoric, she warns that “our 
stark rights vocabulary receives subtle amplification from its 
encoded image of the lone rights-bearer[.]”313 If rights talk is 
inhospitable to the social dimension of personhood, relationships and 
communities, then it is inhospitable to the very considerations that 
ought to inform our copyright law; authorship, after all, is a 
communicative act with an inherently inter-personal dimension.314 
Both the purposes and the limits of copyright protection can be 
appreciated only with a view to the social value of creativity and 
culture, and the importance of a vibrant public domain.315 
In sum, Glendon’s contends, “[o]ur rights-laden discourse . . . 
easily accommodates the economic, the immediate, and the personal 
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dimensions of a problem, while it regularly neglects the moral, the 
long-term, and the social implications.”316 If this is indeed to be the 
nature of our rights-laden copyright discourse, we will neglect the 
very considerations that ought to be informing the development of 
our copyright system. 
Even if we accept these critiques of rights as sound and pertinent, 
however, we may find it hard to shake the sense that the rhetoric of 
user rights is both necessary and desirable if we are to effectively 
restrain copyright and augment the scope for free and lawful use of 
protected works.317 The assertion of rights, as Glendon reminds us, is 
usually a sign of a breakdown in a relationship;318 and so it may be in 
the copyright context, where the needs, capacities and desires of 
users have been subordinated for so long to the demands and dictates 
of owners. We might argue, then, that our situation demands 
recourse—or indeed resort—to user rights.  The determination of 
whose right prevails in the so-called copyright balance may well be 
subject to the whims or political commitments of the judges, but why 
not play the game? There is, in copyright, as in other areas, a good 
politically pragmatic argument for critiquing the critique of rights—
not because it is wrong, perhaps, but because it is unhelpful or even 
harmful to the cause.319 It is to this “critique of the critique” that we 
now briefly turn. 
B. RESORTING TO RIGHTS: POLITICAL PRAGMATISM 
The argument at the heart of the “critique of the critique” of rights 
is that the choice of target is, strategically, a poor one—and, 
politically, a dangerous one.320 Why pull the rug out from under the 
feet of rights that can be leveraged to advance your political goals?  
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Should we not choose our targets in a way that avoids disarming, 
demoralizing, or further disempowering those who share our values 
and ideological goals?  So what if the power of rights is purely 
rhetorical? Why would we not deliberately harness and strategically 
deploy that power for all it’s worth? 
Thus, feminist and critical race theorists (CRT) largely resisted the 
CLS critique of rights, decrying the deconstruction of rights by the 
predominantly white, male Critical Legal Scholars even while 
sympathizing with their fundamental rights-skepticism.321 While few 
feminists or critical race theorists are blind to the conceptual failings 
of liberal legal reasoning or the shifting and political nature of 
‘rights’ as such, most are unwilling to give them up, and usually for 
good reason.322 As Kennedy acknowledges, “the notion is that rights 
rhetoric is or at least once was effective, and we would be giving that 
up by losing faith in rights.”323 Or perhaps worse, “if ‘we’ lose our 
faith in rights rhetoric but ‘they’ don’t, then they will gain an 
advantage over us. . . . ‘Giving up’ rights would be like a 
professional athlete giving up steroids when all her competitors were 
still wedded to them.”324 In the copyright context, to back away from 
user rights while leaving the author’s claim to right intact would only 
perpetuate existing inequalities within the copyright system and 
further obstruct the attainment of its public purposes.325 
Whereas CLS (and its postmodernist offshoots) sought to 
disaggregate the concept of ‘right,’ many feminist and CRT scholars 
contended that this move overlooked the historical potential of rights 
in the real lives and lived experiences of women and racialized 
minorities.326 Feminist scholar Martha Minow defended the use of 
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rights while largely accepting the CLS critique: 
Rights discourse, like any language, may mislead, seduce, falsely 
console, or wrongly inflame.  . . . Yet, I wonder sometimes who I am 
helping and who I am hurting by criticizing rights. It turns out to be 
helpful, useful, and maybe even essential to be able to couch a 
request as a claim of rights. . . .There is something too valuable in the 
aspiration of rights . . . to abandon the rhetoric of rights.327 
Kimberlée Crenshaw, a leading voice in the critical race 
scholarship, also wrote about the gains that have been made through 
the invocation of rights, even while acknowledging their risks and 
limits: 
Rights have been important. They may have legitimated racial 
inequality, but they have also been the means by which oppressed 
groups have secured entry as formal equals into the dominant 
order . . . .Challenges and demands made from outside the 
institutional logic would have accomplished little[.]328 
Perhaps the most powerful example, however, of this uneasy but 
essential compromise is found in Patricia Williams’ work, in which 
she explores her personal discomfort with the CLS critique in spite 
of the “many good reasons for abandoning a system of rights which 
are premised on inequality and helplessness[.]”329 She explains why 
many black scholars remain committed to the pursuit of rights, “even 
if what CLS scholars say about rights—that they are contradictory, 
indeterminate, reified and marginally decisive in social behavior—is 
so.”330 Without idealizing the importance of rights, and recognizing 
that they are “often selectively invoked to draw boundaries, to 
isolate, and to limit,”331 Williams insisted that “the subtlety of rights’ 
real instability . . . does not render unusable their persona of 
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stability.”332 Rather, the “vocabulary of rights” speaks to the 
establishment that holds the keys to social change—change that can 
be argued for “in the sheep’s clothing” of rights.333 
While CLS seek to unmask rights mythology to reveal its 
powerlessness, the CRT perspective invites the historically excluded 
and disempowered to “don the mask” and put its magical power to 
good ends.334 Williams evocatively celebrated the “immense 
alchemical fire” it took for blacks to kindle rights into something 
real, to give them “life where there was none before.”335 She insists 
that there is, in this sense, the possibility of a “dual consciousness” 
with which the historically disadvantaged can see and leverage the 
political potential of rights while still perceiving their lack of 
objective foundation and analytic determinacy.336 
Reflecting on William’s approach, Angela Harris proposes that 
there is strength to be gained from embracing this dilemma.337 The 
task is to “live in the tension itself.”338 For Harris, this suggests two 
aspirations for a “jurisprudence of reconstruction”:339 sophistication 
about the legal subject (the situated, intersectional self);340 and 
disenchantment around the romantic faith in modernism and liberal 
rights.341 Rather than a romantic belief in equality and rights, the 
focus shifts to the process of empowerment and struggle, and the 
continual task of reconstruction.342 
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There are, of course, crucial differences in nature and scope 
between constitutional rights asserted by women and racialized 
people in the demand for equality and dignity, and the copyright and 
user rights claims under discussion here.343 The right to be free from 
state-sanctioned violence, for example, is not in the same realm as 
the right to be free to copy.344 It is worth emphasizing, however, that 
racial and gender inequalities permeate copyright law as they do any 
other area of our law and society. The availability of copyright 
protection and fair use can have significant and disproportionately 
harmful effects for creators and users “from the margins,” silencing 
critique, undermining the value of creative contributions, and 
ultimately denying equal participation in our cultural dialogue.345 
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There are, then, real and not only rhetorical connections between the 
assertion of users’ rights in copyright contexts—the freedom to 
challenge meanings, upset symbols, transform works, to speak and to 
be heard—and the persistent realities of inequality to which our 
copyright system contributes (in particular, through the subordination 
of some voices for the valorization, amplification and economic 
benefit of others).346 
As we tackle the question of user rights, then, it should come as no 
surprise that there are helpful lessons to be drawn from the feminist 
and critical race scholars’ stance on rights.347  Feminist and CRT 
critique of CLS’s attack on rights-based reasoning opens up political 
and conceptual space for a kind of “dual consciousness” on the part 
of advocates of users’ rights in the copyright context.348 The 
proposition would be that users and the public—whose needs and 
interests have been marginalized in the face of owners’ individual 
rights claims—may perceive the inherent flaws of rights-based 
reasoning in the copyright system while nonetheless seeking to 
identify and enforce  countervailing rights. User communities can 
don the mask or the sheep’s clothing of rights to issue a rhetorical 
rallying cry, mobilizing the public and demanding mutual 
recognition within the copyright system.349 
Perhaps it is a similar combination of sophistication and 
disenchantment to which we should aspire in the copyright context. 
The reconstruction of copyright for the digital age requires 
sophistication about the nature of the author/user, and the 
intersectionality350 of our own selfhood: in different contexts, 
moments in time and relationships, we are all authors, users, creators, 
borrowers, producers, consumers, citizens, private individuals and 
members of the public. It also demands disenchantment; we should 
set aside our romantic vision of authorship and originality, as well as 
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our faith in modernist ideals of radical  individuality and 
transcendent rights.351 Strength can be drawn from embracing the 
tension inherent in the simultaneous commitment to, and skepticism 
of, a rights-based copyright system. The focus can shift to the 
process of empowering users and reconstructing copyright in service 
of the public interest. 
The question to be answered is ultimately a strategic one that takes 
into account the way that rights are experienced in this context: Will 
the “enervating effect of rights talk”352 advance the interests and meet 
the needs of users and the public, or will it do more harm than good? 
While the dominant ideology of copyright law remains one of 
possessive individualism and modernist enlightenment values, it may 
make sense to harness its logic to protect downstream authors and 
users.353 If the “vocabulary of rights” speaks to the establishment, 
then it seems wise to use it.354 We should, however, heed Glendon’s 
plea to tone down the “American rights dialect” and “refine our 
rhetoric.”355 The real task will be to ensure that the rights discourse 
employed in the name of the public interest is capable of 
communicating concepts of responsibility, sociality and future-
looking teleology, for these are vital to understanding both why we 
have copyright and why copyright has limits. It may still be possible 
for us to reclaim and reimagine rights in the copyright realm in a way 
that fundamentally reshapes the system for the benefit of us all.356 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To be skeptical about the language of user rights is not to be 
against user rights within the copyright system. Whether or not to 
invoke the rhetoric of user rights is not a question about whether 
libraries should be permitted to make copies for patrons, or teachers 
for their students, and so on. (They should.) Nor is it to query 
whether flexible fair use provisions should replace fair dealing, or 
international treaties should require parties to enact adequate 
exceptions. (They should.) It is, rather, a question about the discourse 
through which we want to conduct the argument about the 
appropriate limits of copyright. 
There is scope, certainly, for the assertion of user rights as a way 
to formulate demands for a fair use defense, for example, while 
“being conscious of the critique of the whole enterprise, sensing the 
shiftiness of the sand beneath one’s feet.”357 But there is also a risk to 
shoring up the enterprise—in this case, the rights-based copyright 
model—at precisely the spot where we know the ground is unstable 
for the users and public interest advocates trying to take a stand. 
The danger, I have suggested, is that we firmly tie our position—
on the need for a strong public domain, the importance of the public 
interest, the centrality of fair use and the importance of recognizing 
copyright’s limits—to the vindication of individual rights as the 
defining logic of copyright law.358 Rather than defusing the authors’ 
rights claim as obfuscatory legal fiction that masks political interests, 
we simply “see” that right and “raise” our own on behalf of the user.  
For those of us who have argued against the use of rights-based 
reasoning to advance the cause of an ever-expanding copyright 
monopoly, there is surely “something ‘weakening’ or ‘undermining’” 
about the fact that we are using exactly the rhetoric we had sought to 
discredit.359 And for those of us committed to the notion that 
copyright is simply a regulatory tool to achieve a desired social end 
(the encouragement of learning or creativity, or the progress of the 
arts), it is surely a step backwards to endorse a “balance” between 
owners’ and users’ “rights.”360 
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By tying up public interest objectives in the discourse of rights and 
counter-rights, balances and trumps, we risk losing sight of—even 
losing the ability to credibly articulate—objections to copyright’s 
over-reach in terms that are community-oriented, functional and 
value-driven. Rather than appealing to the need to encourage cultural 
creativity, advance participatory democracy and development goals, 
enhance education and enjoyment of the arts, we risk reducing these 
overarching political and social objectives to the clashing of 
individual rights.361 Rather than asking what laws in a particular 
country, or what outcome in a particular case, would best align with 
and advance the public purposes of our copyright system, we might 
limit ourselves to asking whose individual right should prevail. 
There is no doubt, however, that in the context of an international 
copyright regime dominated by corporate concerns over the 
protection of intellectual property rights, “the very idea that users of 
copyright works should have ‘rights’ is decidedly empowering.”362 
User rights may still be the most effective tool at our disposal to 
advance the interests of users of protected works and the public in 
general in the face of the powerful rights-based claims of authors and 
corporate owners. After all, “user rights” seem to have conquered 
more ground for the public domain in Canada, at least, than abstract 
ideas about the public interest or warnings about the dangers of over-
protection ever have before.363 Acknowledging that disputes about 
the scope of control over intellectual works typically and 
increasingly find their articulation in claims of rights (whether to 
property or free speech, copyright or users’ rights), perhaps our 
energies are better spent debating “not whether but how the language 
of rights will be used.”364 Ultimately, as Jennifer Nedelsky asserts, 
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rights are just “a particular institutional and rhetorical means of 
expressing, contesting, and implementing . . .  values.”365 In efforts to 
globalize fair use or to safeguard and strengthen L&Es in our 
international copyright system, we should employ whatever 
rhetorical means will best communicate, to the relevant audience, the 
social values at stake when copyright overreaches. 
My hope is that the turn towards user rights-talk will prove to be 
effective in articulating and advancing a fairer copyright regime 
around the globe. But there remains cause for caution: to simply rely 
on the abstract assertion of user rights as the vehicle to drive the 
public interest and to restrain copyright’s reach could be to sacrifice 
a “functional approach” for “transcendental nonsense”366—perhaps 
advancing immediate political aims, but potentially undermining 
larger social goals by reducing them to yet another individual rights-
claim clumsily thrown onto copyright’s (illusory) balancing scales. 
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